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Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 introduced the Simplified Corpo-
ration (Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada or SAS). This type of 
business entity included modern corporate law features such as sim-
plified incorporation proceedings, full-fledged limited liability for 
its shareholders, and broad freedom of contract for the definition of 
housekeeping and governance rules. It also reduced old-fashioned 
prohibitions pertaining to shareholders and managers activities and 
reduced transaction costs. The SAS’s “opt-in” approach also has 
allowed for private parties to draft the most suitable agreements. 
The enabling provisions of Law 1258 have been the starting point 
for the preparation of at least three Model Law proposals presented 
before the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Na-
tions Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and 
the Pacific Alliance.  
Discussions on these draft legislative models have been under-
way over the last few years at different bodies within these multina-
tional organizations. Although some progress has been made in rec-
ognizing the importance of providing some degree of harmonization 
in the field of closely held business enterprises, particularly in de-
veloping jurisdictions, there are still significant obstacles that need 
to be surpassed before such model law is adopted. In June, 2017 the 
OAS General Assembly recommended to the Organization’s mem-
ber States to adopt the Interamerican Model Law on Simplified Cor-
porations. It is the first successful attempt for the international har-
monization on the rules concerning business corporations.  
 
Keywords: corporate law, model law, simplified corporations, har-
monization, Columbian SAS, Organization of American States 
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I. INTRODUCTION: A MODEL LAW ON SIMPLIFIED CORPORATIONS 
On June 20, 2017, the General Assembly of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) adopted a resolution1 in which it requested 
the Inter-American Juridical Committee and its Technical Secretar-
iat to give the broadest possible publicity to the Model Law on Sim-
plified Corporations. In the same resolution, the General Assembly 
requested the General Secretariat to provide the OAS Member 
States all the necessary cooperation and support if they decided to 
adopt the Model Law or any parts thereof. The General Assembly’s 
decision represents a significant step towards the harmonization of 
company law in the Americas, since it is the first instrument ever 
produced in this legal area.2 
This paper discusses the OAS Model Law on Simplified Corpo-
rations3 (hereinafter also referred to as the “Model Law”), and ana-
lyzes harmonization of laws concerning closely held entities, espe-
cially in emerging jurisdictions. This paper also contains an analysis 
concerning some of the current legislative approaches to corporate 
law existing in emerging jurisdictions, and summarizes certain dif-
ficulties that entrepreneurs encounter when confronted with legal 
formalism. It also describes the scope of the Model Law and the 
legislation upon which it was based, i.e., the Colombian Law on 
Simplified Corporations (hereinafter also referred to as “Colombian 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Model Law on the Simplified Corporation, Resolution AG/RES.2906 
(XLVII-O/17), adopted at the first plenary session held on June 20, 2017. For the 
Model Act on the Simplified Stock Corporation, see https://perma.cc/X92E-
DDM9 [hereinafter Model Law]. 
 2. The resolution was adopted by unanimous consent at the General Assem-
bly with the exception of Venezuela. 
 3. During its March 2011 regular session, the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee approved the Model Law on Simplified Corporations. See Project for 
a Model Act on Simplified Stock Corporation, CJI Res. 188 (LXXX-O/12), 
CJI/doc.380/11 (Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter OAS Resolution 188]; See also Draft 
OAS Model Law on the Simplified Stock Corporation (SAS) considered at Annual 
Meeting of ASORLAC, OAS NEWSLETTER (Oct. 2014), at https://perma.cc 
/6EVA-ASQ4. On various occasions, the Model Law was presented before the 
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs. This body remanded the initiative 
to the Permanent Council which, on its meeting of June 14, 2017 adopted the 
resolution concerning the Model Law, which was eventually sent to the OAS; See 
OAS G.A. Res. 2609, AG/doc.5579/17, at https://perma.cc/2MAT-NLNR. 
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SAS”).4 In this vein, the empirical data distilled from the Colombian 
experience illustrates the appropriateness of most solutions pro-
posed in the Model Law. 
Following this brief introduction, section II discusses the objec-
tive behind the enactment of the Model Law, and the current prob-
lems affecting the Latin American legislative agenda. The core idea 
is that the adoption of the Model Law will help broaden the formal 
economy and foster economic growth and welfare for the popula-
tion. In fact, it is well known that formalization is a crucial factor 
without which businesses find it hard to have access to credit from 
financial institutions; the state cannot collect revenues derived from 
taxes, and workers are deprived from social security benefits.  It is 
argued that introducing the forward-looking rules contained in the 
Model Law can correct most corporate law deficiencies in the region 
and could produce the desired economic results. Section III contains 
a summary of the main contents of the Model Law, as well as an 
explanation as to how these provisions can improve current corpo-
rate law in the region. Section IV contains empirical data on the Co-
lombian experience concerning the Simplified Corporation (SAS by 
its Spanish acronym) over nearly a decade. The relevance of the Co-
lombian SAS is emphasized given its significant influence in the 
preparation of the Model Law. The collection of empirical data pro-
vides compelling arguments in favor of the Model Law’s adoption. 
Section V provides an analysis of the Colombian Specialized Cor-
porate Law Court. This section is intended to underscore the fact 
that, in order for substantive legal transplants in the corporate sphere 
to be effective, they must be accompanied by reforms aimed at 
strengthening the institutional infrastructure. Lastly, section VI pre-




                                                                                                             
 4. Colombian Law on Simplified Corporations introduced by Law no. 1258, 
Dec. 5, 2008, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]. 
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II. WHY A MODEL LAW ON SIMPLIFIED CORPORATIONS? 
The Model Law is aimed at reducing transaction costs in start-
ing, carrying out, and closing any given business venture, irrespec-
tive of its dimensions or business activity. It is argued that reducing 
transaction costs for business fosters economic growth and trade, 
and may incentivize formal economic activity in emerging econo-
mies. World Bank researchers have found that “informality is not 
single-caused but results from the combination of poor public ser-
vices, a burdensome regulatory regime, and weak monitoring and 
enforcement capacity by the state.”5 The initiative is thus intended 
to counter the final two characteristics of informality: a burdensome 
regulatory regime and weak enforcement capacity by the state. It is 
expected that reducing informality by setting up an enabling envi-
ronment for business, will ultimately enhance economic develop-
ment and provide welfare for the people of a given jurisdiction.6 
The Model Law initiative is also intended to fulfill additional 
useful purposes. First, regional trade may be increased by a process 
that involves simplifying the legal formalities required for undertak-
ing entrepreneurial activity. Second, at the local level, defining a 
less onerous threshold for businesspersons setting up micro, small, 
and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to enter the formal economy may 
be achieved by simplifying the incorporation process. Finally, there 
is also an academic purpose in the Model Law initiative. Despite the 
importance of comparative company law as an academic discipline, 
before the OAS Model Law, there had not been any comprehensive 
initiatives geared towards the creation of a harmonizing instrument 
in this area of law. In 2006, comparative law professor Klaus J. Hopt 
                                                                                                             
 5. Norman Loayza, Luis Servén & Naotaka Sugawara, Informality in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 4888, Apr. 20, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/QJ3Z-6QXE. 
 6. According to Hansman and Kraakman, the general goal of corporate law 
is to advance aggregate welfare of constituencies affected by the activities of an 
enterprise. The Model Law intends to further said goal. See REINER KRAAKMAN 
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH ch. 1 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 2017). The goals advanced by the Model 
Law are in line with contemporary policies that give preference to business forms 
referred to as “uncorporations.” See LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION ch. 1 (Oxford U. Press 2009). 
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complained about the absence of such a project: “In view of the 
golden age of the elaboration of common principles of law such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
and the Principles of European Contract Law, it is astonishing that 
similarly successful work has not yet been undertaken in the area of 
company law.”7 The initiative also intends to serve as a stepping-
stone to fill this gap in private international law.8 
The initiative assumes that harmonization of the company law 
framework within Latin America may be achieved.9 This endeavor 
involves two distinct processes: (i) reaching a common understand-
ing between different, albeit related, legal systems; and (ii) facilitat-
ing the mutual recognition of corporations doing business in a des-
ignated region. In this context, achieving a common understanding 
refers to bridging the different legal languages within various juris-
dictions. Arguably, reaching a set of homogenous legal terms will 
promote economic integration by facilitating the interaction be-
tween entrepreneurs (and their advisors).10 Achieving a mutual 
                                                                                                             
 7. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1172 (Reimann & Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 
2008). 
 8. It is relevant to underscore the efforts of the Organization for the Business 
Law Harmonization in Africa (Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du 
Droit des Affaires) (OAHADA). The treaty that gave rise to this organization was 
executed in Port Louis, on October 17, 1993, and later revised in Quebec, on Oc-
tober 17, 2008. This organization has passed a uniform act on corporations, which 
regulates, inter alia, the relationships among shareholders, the integration of cor-
porate organs, the management of the corporation, the access to capital, and the 
transfers of shares of stock. The Uniform Act is applicable to all signatory states 
of the Harmonization Treaty. There are 17 OAHADA states: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Ni-
ger, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, and Togo. 
 9. Since Model Laws are legislative instruments that are not vested with any 
coercive powers, it is up to each of the member state governments to adopt such 
rules altogether or to use them as a prototypical structure that can be partially 
imitated. Thus, one of the main benefits of the Model Law is to offer legislators 
of all OAS member states broad parameters on the topic, so that each legislature 
can find inspiration for the enactment of its own corporate laws, and if the case 
may be, to take advantage of the model provisions to harmonize its legislation by 
incorporating the above-quoted best practices. 
 10. The experience of the EU law harmonization is useful. It has been argued 
by the European Commission that “disparate national law rules may lead to higher 
transaction costs, especially information and possible litigation costs for enter-
prises in general and SMEs and consumers in particular.” See E.C. O.J. 2001, 
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recognition of corporations relates to the process of hosting a foreign 
entity in a local jurisdiction without requiring compliance with cum-
bersome and costly formalities in the receiving country.11 The ef-
fective mutual recognition of foreign enterprises is also intended to 
promote cross-border entrepreneurial activity and to reduce transac-
tion costs involved in operating in new markets. 
At the local level, it is well-known that millions of MSMEs cur-
rently face significant formalistic barriers preventing them from en-
tering the formal economy.12 Transaction costs are here evident in 
light of the cumbersome proceedings required to undertake the pro-
cess of incorporation. In the Latin American region, the informal 
economy is prevalent and micro and small entrepreneurs frequently 
find that the benefits of operating formally are outweighed by the 
                                                                                                             
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on European Contract Law (2001/C 255/01) 5, no. 31, at https://perma 
.cc/H4A8-HJGF. Facilitated interaction between businesspersons will entail a re-
duction of costs and will also facilitate economic integration within the region. 
FRANCISCO REYES, II LATIN AMERICAN COMPANY LAW—A NEW POLICY 
AGENDA: RESHAPING THE CLOSELY HELD LANDSCAPE 67 (Carolina Acad. Press 
2013): 
Harmonization in the field of company law could be a sensible step in 
the context of the process of integration, particularly taking into consid-
eration the fact that several countries throughout the region have either 
entered into or are in the process of negotiating free trade agreements 
with the United States. 
 11. The concept of mutual recognition is explained by Nicolaidis & Shaffer: 
Mutual recognition regimes set the conditions governing the recognition 
of the validity of foreign laws, regulations, standards, and certification 
procedures among states in order to assure host country regulatory offi-
cials and citizens that their application within their borders is “compati-
ble” with their own, and that incoming products and services are safe. 
These conditions involve different types of obligations for home states, 
who benefit from conditional recognition of the laws and regulations ap-
plicable to products, persons, firms and services, and host states, who 
forego the application of their own rules to products, persons, firms and 
services, provided that the agreed conditions are met.  
Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Re-
gimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 
264 (2004). 
 12. Studies on informality in Latin America show the link between highly 
informal economies and formalistic barriers to achieve an organized business ac-
tivity: “Informality is sometimes the result of agents ‘exiting’ the formal sector as 
consequence of cost-benefit considerations; other times, it is the outcome of 
agents being ‘excluded’ from formality as this becomes restrictive and the econ-
omy segmented.” See Loayza, Servén & Sugawara, supra note 5, at 2. 
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high costs involved in such operation.13 The existence of an infor-
mal economy also results in the loss of opportunities for foreign in-
vestment, which is crucial for less developed economies.14 Thus, 
such informality also impacts the collection of taxes which, in turn, 
hinders the availability of funds for revenue distribution.15  
Business informality in several countries of Latin America 
reaches high figures that can be even above 50 percent. According 
to Professor David Stewart, a study shows that: 
[I]n our hemisphere, both big and small economies depend 
upon informally-created micro and small companies 
(“MiPymes”) for much of their employment. In El Salvador, 
MiPymes accounted for 99.6% of all of businesses in 2005, 
and 90.52% of these were microenterprises located in urban 
areas and especially in the capital city of San Salvador. Most 
Salvadoran micro-businesses are conducted by a single indi-
vidual or with the assistance of one or two additional em-
ployees. In Brazil, according to a report from the Serviço 
Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (Brazil-
ian Service for the Support of Micro and Small Businesses), 
the number of microenterprises grew 9.1% from 1997 to 
2003, from 9,477,973 to 10,335,962, employing over 13 mil-
lion people. In Mexico, 99% of all Mexican businesses fall 
under the rubric of “micro,” “small” or “medium-sized” en-
terprises, employing approximately 60% of the population, 
                                                                                                             
 13. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
presents the link between informality and, among others, regulatory restraints: 
“Informality and gender gaps remain high, and social mobility low.” OECD, 
OECD Economic Surveys: Colombia 2017 (Paris, May 2017), https://perma.cc 
/7GYD-J3S9. 
 14. World Bank researchers have evidenced the correlation between the in-
formal sector and low levels of investment: “[T]he informal sector contributes to 
an inimical investment climate for formal firms, particularly foreign investors. 
Further, the informal sector in general and large informal firms in particular are 
responsible for a substantial loss of fiscal revenues and narrowing of the tax base.” 
Nancy Benjamin, Kathleen Beegle, Francesca Recanatini, & Massimiliano San-
tini, Informal Economy and the World Bank (World Bank Policy Research Work-
ing Paper Series, Paper No. 6888, Apr. 20, 2016), available at https://perma.cc 
/57FB-3QSG. 
 15. For the purposes of this paper, an informal enterprise is that in which no 
registration process, or other specific formalities required by each jurisdiction, has 
been undertaken. See Abby Margolis, The Value of Informal Enterprise, 
STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REVIEW, Nov. 1, 2012, https://perma.cc/TM4X-
QKZD. 
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and MiPymes are responsible for more than 20% of Mex-
ico’s gross domestic product.16 
To further illustrate the problem of informality of MSMEs, it is 
suitable to refer to the data collected by the World Bank in 201517: 
- In the developing world, there are between 365 million and 
445 million MSMEs. 
- Of that number only 25–30 million are formal Small and Me-
dium Enterprises (SMEs) and, only, between 55–70 million 
are formal Micro Enterprises. 
- 285 out of 345 million MSMEs, over 70% are considered 
informal and consequently, lack access to credit. 
In contrast with the data above, four out of every five jobs in 
emerging economies are created by MSMEs, providing over 33% of 
the national income in these jurisdictions.18 These data reveal the 
importance of MSMEs for emerging economies, as well as the ex-
isting potential for developing a strong formal economy. 
As a result of informality, these MSMEs, which make up the 
bulk of the productive capacity, lack access to credit. The following 
image contains a map of the World showing the credit gap between 
informal and formal firms:  
 
                                                                                                             
 16. See David Stewart, Recommendations on the Proposed Model Act on the 
Simplified Stock Corporation, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee 50 (2012) (quoting a study prepared by Boris Kozolchyk & Cristina 
Castaneda). See also OAS Resolution 188, supra note 3. 
 17. Simon Bell & Ghada Teima, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Fi-
nance, THE WORLD BANK, Sep. 1, 2015. 
 18. See Margolis, supra note 15. See also, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing 
but Wind”? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 104 (2010): 
Non-public-corporation business organizations (NPCBOs) play a major 
role not just in advanced industrialized economies, but even more in the 
transition and emerging market economies that have become increas-
ingly important. They are major sources of employment, and are an es-
sential stage in the life cycle of the large, successful public corporation. 
To focus on public corporations without understanding how NPCBOs 
operate, then, is to overlook a major part of the global economic land-
scape. 
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Figure 1. Total Credit Gap Map19 
The implications of the lack of access to credit for MSMEs are 
noteworthy. Firms that cannot access legal sources of finance have 
limited growth opportunities and therefore cannot contribute to the 
economy in a significant way.20 Formalization of MSMEs is needed 
in order to provide capital-raising opportunities for large sectors of 
the economy. 
In furtherance of the objectives set out above, the Model Law 
initiative is aimed at creating the appropriate incentives in order for 
informal firms to migrate into the formal economy. This will be 
done mainly by introducing less burdensome incorporation proce-
dures and reducing transaction costs in general throughout the life 
cycle of the firm. The underlying concept is straightforward: firms 
should be able to comply with a simplified registration process, fa-
cilitating incorporation, and ensuring compliance with basic regula-
                                                                                                             
 19. See Margolis, supra note 15. 
 20. See Bell & Teima, supra note 17. 
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tions. As the World Bank has stated: “Studies have shown that re-
moving excessive bureaucratic formalities in the startup process has 
numerous benefits for both economies and entrepreneurs. Some of 
these gains include higher levels of firm formalization, economic 
growth and greater profits.”21 For many decades it has been compel-
lingly argued that migration into the formal system will produce sev-
eral benefits including the following: higher tax revenues, better reg-
ulation, social security protection and labor formalization, higher 
levels of transparency and disclosure, better access to credit and 
government services, and higher levels of investment.22 Other posi-
tive consequences for fully complying firms are benefitting from 
limited liability and asset partitioning, among others.23 
A. Focus on Latin America 
The Model Law has been designed with a focus on Latin Amer-
ica.24 There are two reasons for this regional approach. First, the 
Colombian experience with the recent introduction of the SAS pro-
vides a compelling body of statistics and facts (discussed in depth 
below), which can serve as a benchmark for the adoption of this 
model in other similar jurisdictions. Second, the Latin American 
scenario offers useful features given the size of the economies in this 
geographic area, as well as the transitional nature of their econo-
mies.  
In line with the initiative’s regional focus, as stated by Jeannette 
M.E. Tramhel, the OAS Model Law is grounded upon the Colom-
bian legislation:  
[B]oth the Colombian Law and the SAS Model Law on 
which it is based contain the key elements that are essential 
                                                                                                             
 21. See World Bank Group, Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All, 
doc. 14 (Washington, D.C., 2017), at https://perma.cc/9ZQ8-TTBC. 
 22. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, EL OTRO SENDERO—LA REVOLUCIÓN 
INFORMAL ch. 3, 220 (7th ed., La Oveja Negra 1987). 
 23. For an insightful discussion into the characteristics of the firm and its 
many benefits, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6. 
 24. Latin America consists of 22 countries, with seven official languages, a 
total population of about 605 million people, and a surface of roughly 22,222,000 
km2. See South America: Physical Geography, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, 
https://perma.cc/KZ8K-PER4. 
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to simplified incorporation . . . . These elements could be 
considered to comprise ‘global best practices’ as most have 
been identified as key by various entities, including the 
World Bank, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’), 
among others.25  
A second feature of the Model Law initiative relates to excluding 
listed companies from its scope. In this way, the accent has been 
placed on closely held entities. It is a well-known fact that most 
companies in Latin American are family owned and trade outside of 
stock exchanges.26 Recently, the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) published its Corporate Govern-
ance Factbook for 2017, noting the highly concentrated ownership 
                                                                                                             
 25. Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, The Simplified Corporation: A New Structure 
for Doing Business in the Americas?, 24 AGENDA INTERNACIONAL 144-145 
(2017). Likewise, Professor David Stewart recognizes the significant influence 
that the Colombian simplified corporations law had on the OAS initiative: 
Under the Colombian approach, the SAS can be formed by one or more 
shareholders and can be incorporated by a relatively simple private or 
electronic document (as opposed to an expensive notarial deed of incor-
poration). The cost is minimal. The act of incorporation provides limited 
liability to its shareholders (except when the corporate veil is used to 
perpetrate a fraud or abuse the corporate form). It also provides protec-
tion to third party victims of the abusive or fraudulent use of the ultra 
vires doctrine by corporate officials. It enables the founders to choose an 
unlimited duration for the incorporation, and replaces the costly and in-
effective formality of mandatory internal comptrollers (comisarios) with 
a more effective and less expensive supervision of external but fully 
qualified auditors. It also provides flexibility to corporate capital, greater 
contractual freedom, and increased access to capital. 
See Stewart, supra note 16, at 50. See also, Jorge Oviedo Albán, La sociedad por 
acciones simplificada en el derecho colombiano, in LA TIPOLOGÍA DE LAS 
SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES—ENTRE TRADICIÓN Y REFORMA 174 (Grupo Editorial 
Ibañez 2017) [hereinafter SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES]: “It is noteworthy that Law 
1258 [of 2008] on simplified corporations has formed the basis for the Model Law 
enacted by the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee, in its 80th Session Period . . . .” 
 26. The empirical analysis of the Brazilian corporate market by Érica Gorga 
evidences the characteristics generally seen throughout the region: 
The study of Brazilian economic reality has shown that the model pro-
posed by Berle and Means may not serve as a basis for the analysis of 
Brazilian corporate law. In fact, the Brazilian corporate reality did not 
follow the same development trend that the American corporations did. 
In Brazil, as a general rule, there is no degree of disjunction between 
property and control, which supports the theory of Berle and Means. 
ÉRICA GORGA, DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO ATUAL 129 (Elsevier 2013). 
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structure of listed companies in several Latin American jurisdic-
tions. 




Noting the trend above, it is useful to establish the relative size 
of the securities markets in the region in terms of number of listed 
companies. For example, Brazil, the region’s largest economy also 
has the greatest number of listed companies. In 2010, there were 400 
corporations listed in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (the 
BOVESPA).28 In contrast, for the same period the United States had 
approximately 5,000 listed companies in the U.S. stock markets.29  
The focus on non-listed companies is also a characteristic of the 
Colombian law of 2008. Pursuant to Law 1258 of that year, the SAS 
is not intended to go public. The underlying rationale here is that the 
level of flexibility of these provisions is incompatible with the share-
holder protection that is needed concerning listed corporations. In 
accordance with Article 4 of the aforementioned law, the shares of 
stock and any other securities issued by a simplified corporation 
                                                                                                             
 27. OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2017, 12 et seq. (2017), 
https://perma.cc/248B-SEA3. 
 28. See Pierre Habbard, Hans-Böckler-Foundation, Corporate Governance 
in Brazil - An International Trade Union Perspective (Paris, Apr. 2010), 
https://perma.cc/T85D-XSBS. 
 29. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010 Bogle Fi-
nancial Markets Research Center, https://perma.cc/KVN7-YR3X. 
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shall not be listed in the National Registry of Securities and Issuers, 
nor traded in any stock exchange.  
Inspired by the Anglo-American approach to securities regula-
tion, as well as certain European models such as the German Neuer 
Markt, there have been attempts to broaden some Latin American 
securities markets, but this has had limited success.30 The approach 
adopted in the Model Law is different. One of the main objectives 
of the initiative is to offer MSMEs a simplified framework to facil-
itate low cost access to the formal sector, and thus to bank financing. 
This proposal is coherent with the corporate structure prevailing in 
Latin America where the bulk of the economic building capacity is 
associated with MSMEs, instead of firms large enough to trade their 
stocks on the securities markets. This orientation is not intended to 
suggest that the introduction of high corporate governance standards 
is to be ignored. However, efforts should now be directed towards 
introducing and consolidating corporate governance standards spe-
cifically tailored to the characteristics of the Latin American mar-
kets.  
The approach of the Model Law also responds to the need for a 
specific set of provisions directed at the establishment and operation 
of closely held entities. General corporate law in Latin America has 
responded to the codification models adopted in the region, which 
sometimes fail to provide for regulation aimed at the close corpora-
tion. American scholars have acknowledged the need to introduce 
these types of statutes:  
Corporate statutes try to fit corporations closely held by a 
                                                                                                             
 30. José Miguel Mendoza, The Controlling Shareholder as Reputational In-
termediary (Oxford Centre for Corporate Reputation Working Paper Series, Paper 
No. 302, Mar. 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/745X-GGLC: 
More than a decade on, the results of these experiments in legal reform 
have been disappointing. Convergence around formal rules of investor 
protection has not contributed significantly to the growth of stock mar-
kets in emerging countries. Empirical tests in fact show that these efforts 
were mostly futile and in many cases counterproductive.  
For the discussion regarding the adoption of more European models, see Bruno 
Salama & Viviane Muller, Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders of Listed 
Corporations in Brazil: Brief History, Legal Structure and Empirical Evidence, 4 
J. CIV. L. STUD. (2011), available at https://perma.cc/5EYM-XF9T. 
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few shareholders into the same legal clothes worn by pub-
licly-held corporations. But it’s a poor fit. The shareholders 
of a close corporation are likely to think of themselves as 
partners who incorporated their business to obtain limited li-
ability or sometimes for tax reasons. They often find that the 
corporate rules of centralized management and majority con-
trol are at odds with their expectations of decentralized 
equality. They may wonder why they can’t simply manage 
the business as they agree.31 
B. Problems with the Legislative Agenda in the Latin American Re-
gion 
Throughout Latin America, it is hard to find investment vehicles 
that can serve the business community with legal structures en-
dowed with enough flexibility to respond adequately to the demands 
of trade in the modern world. The lack of modern regulations aimed 
at facilitating the incorporation and operation of business entities 
can become a meaningful obstacle for job creation and access to 
credit and, more generally, to economic development. Many of the 
corporate structures present in Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries date back to 19th century regulations characterized by formal-
ism and several restrictions to private ordering. 
The Model Law on Simplified Corporations contains basic pro-
visions that would allow business entities of varying dimensions to 
incorporate and operate in conditions that are appropriate to their 
economic needs. Despite the fact that the simplified corporation is 
particularly suitable for MSMEs, it is also true that it can be used to 
structure businesses of a larger dimension. 
Following is a discussion of some of the prevailing characteris-
tics of Latin American corporate law that constitute a hindrance to 
the formalization of new business entities in the region.32 Thus, by 
taking into consideration the problems with the legal regime, the 
                                                                                                             
 31. ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 1001 (West 2010). 
 32. For a more comprehensive analysis, see REYES, supra note 10. Although 
this paper is centered in Latin America’s legislative agenda, it is noteworthy that 
some of the findings are not exclusive of this geographic area, and therefore may 
also be applicable to different emerging nations such as those located in parts of 
Asia and Africa. 
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Model Law is intended to provide tailor-made solutions that are 
suited to the specific needs of Latin American businesspersons.33 As 
recently noted by Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, commenting on the prob-
lems with Latin American corporate law: “[A]s a result of these as-
pects of company law, which run counter to global best practices 
described above, many Latin American businesses are significantly 
restricted and operate at a competitive disadvantage. Although this 
situation affects all business, the consequences are particularly se-
vere for MSMEs.”34 
1. Entry Barriers 
The first issue is the excessive and cumbersome set of formali-
ties that businesspeople have to endure in order to incorporate in the 
region. Some legal scholars believe that excessive formalism in 
Latin America is derived from Spanish and Portuguese colonial her-
itage, which has been embedded in the region’s legal DNA.35  
                                                                                                             
 33. As noted above, the Model Law is in line with the Colombian legal reform 
of the SAS. The initial diagnosis and the objectives of both pieces of legislation 
are very similar: 
The starting point for the Simplified Corporation’s original proposal was 
the idea of facilitating the formalization of business entities and updating 
the legal system in order to introduce forward-looking approaches to 
Corporate Law. For that purpose, a thorough critical revision of the pre-
vious Company Law framework was required. This analysis was made 
under a functional Comparative Law methodology along with the appli-
cation of relevant notions of Economic Analysis of Law. As expected, 
the results of such evaluation revealed the inadequacy of most Company 
Law provisions in place and the need to carry out an overhaul of both the 
legal and the institutional frameworks. 
Francisco Reyes, The Colombian Simplified Corporation An Empirical Analysis 
of a Success Story in Corporate Law Reform, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 392, 
396 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/7B7J-2Q76. 
 34. See Tramhel, supra, note 25, at 9. 
 35. This legalistic trait is masterfully explained by Keith Rosenn in his anal-
ysis of Brazilian legal culture: 
Closely related to legalism is the exaggerated concern with legal formal-
ities. Every nation has some formalistic behavior, but Brazilian concern 
with authenticity and verification is both impressive and oppressive. Le-
gally permitting a friend to drive one's car requires written, notarized 
authorization. In many situations the signature of the notary must itself 
be verified. Foreigners may be validly divorced abroad, but before Bra-
zilian officials will accord the foreign decree any validity, the document 
must be translated by the Foreign Office and homologated by the Su-
preme Federal Tribunal . . . . The presumption appears to be that every 
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The Doing Business Index published by the World Bank is help-
ful in identifying the problems created by excessive formalism. One 
of the areas measured by the Index is the ease (or difficulty) of start-
ing a business. Figure 2 below compares the number of days re-
quired to incorporate (or start a business) in several jurisdictions. 
Most Latin American jurisdictions are badly ranked. 
Figure 2. Selected Ranking: Expedience of Incorporation Proceed-
ings36 
 
Upon reviewing the best practices of highly ranked jurisdictions 
in the Doing Business Index, it is noticeable that countries with the 
best performance offer entrepreneurs a set of enabling rules that fa-
cilitate incorporation. Ease of starting a business is founded upon 
                                                                                                             
citizen is lying unless he produces written, documentary proof that he is 
telling the truth. 
Keith Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System 
and its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514, 530 (1971). 
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online procedures, a limited number of forms that have to be filled 
in order to accomplish the process, and the absence of notary publics 
or registrars with costly and lengthy formalities. In New Zealand, 
for example, the entire process can be completed by applying for 
registration on the Companies Office’s website,37 and it takes only 
a few hours to complete. The World Bank recommends the imple-
mentation of the so-called “one stop shop strategy” by which all pro-
ceedings related to incorporation can be accomplished before a sin-
gle window, either physical or virtual. In this manner, a single gov-
ernmental office is entrusted with processing not only the business 
registration but also the tax ID, social security, business licenses, 
etc. Within developing jurisdictions, the case of Kenya is a good 
example of improvement made by providing an efficient business 
registration system.38  
At the other end of the spectrum, the World Bank argues that 
Brazil incorporation takes an overwhelming 101 days.39 This is the 
result of a highly bureaucratic procedure. The general rule in Latin 
American countries is that incorporation requires that the applicant 
personally appear before the respective governmental entity (tax, 
social security, pension and severance funds, notary public, 
mercantile registry, foreign direct investment registration, 
environmental permits, business license, etc.), fill out long forms, 
                                                                                                             
 37. See Companies Register, NEW ZEALAND COMPANIES OFFICE, at 
https://perma.cc/V2LX-MMED. The first step is to log on through the setting up 
of a user account on the designated website. Afterwards, the applicant must re-
serve the corporate name, complete the relevant forms, and pay the registration 
fee. Responses notifications, and the certificate of incorporation from the compa-
nies’ office are sent by e-mail. While incorporating a company, an applicant can, 
at the same time, register online for the Goods and Services Tax and apply for a 
company Inland Revenue Department number. See Ease of Doing Business in 
New Zealand, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma.cc/24BF-PRW7. 
 38. According to the Doing Business Report, Kenya’s improvement in the 
“starting a business” segment resulted in a change in rank of 34 places from 2016 
to 2017. See Ease of Doing Business in Kenya, THE WORLD BANK, at 
https://perma.cc/6J86-4EJT. Additionally, the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is currently developing a legislative guide 
for registration of businesses, which is deemed particularly useful for emerging 
economies. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report 
of Working Group I (MSMEs) on the work of its twenty-eighth session (New York, 
1-9 May 2017) A/CN.9/900 (Vienna, 2017), at https://perma.cc/ECT6-EE8G. 
 39. See Ease of Doing Business in Brazil, THE WORLD BANK, at 
https://perma.cc/UN2R-Y93U. 
2018]                                   OAS MODEL LAW                                             19 
 
and, consequently, spend a considerable amount of time and 
money.40  
The way towards facilitating incorporation procedures is not 
without obstacles. There are many powerful stakeholders and pres-
sure groups who may wish to perpetuate the status quo, as there is a 
lot to gain by maintaining the rents derived from formalistic proce-
dures, which require third party intervention. José Mendoza points 
out the political economy problem associated with the powerful in-
fluence of such groups:  
Local institutional arrangements can produce significant 
benefits for interest groups. These groups can easily coordi-
nate their actions in order to block any changes to the insti-
tutions from which they obtain these benefits, regardless of 
whether reform would also enhance overall welfare. Re-
sistance to institutional reform can manifest itself through 
the open obstruction of legislative initiatives or by subtler 
tactics such as the promotion or acceptance of ineffective 
rules.41 
However, this rent-seeking phenomenon is not specific to Latin 
American or other emerging jurisdictions. As noted by Jesper Lau 
Hansen, the EU has also faced opposition from certain sectors 
against the simplification of corporate law:  
Besides the natural tendency of vested interest to uphold the 
status quo, the system of notaries is often lauded for being 
efficient, fairly inexpensive and an important safeguard that 
may also guide the founders of the company on difficult 
questions of company law. For these reasons, the [Societas 
                                                                                                             
 40. See REYES, supra note 10. As already discussed, the formalistic traits of 
the region’s legal tradition are rooted in the colonial period. Procedures and ritu-
alism for incorporation of business associations have been in place ever since. 
This fact is shown in the early presence of the notary publics, which were also 
referred to as “scribes.” See MATTHEW C. MIRROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW—A 
HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 75 (U. of 
Texas Press 2004); Mirrow notes that during colonial times, in order to incorpo-
rate “[t]he members needed to sign an agreement (estatutos) before two witnesses 
and a scribe.” 
 41. José Miguel Mendoza, Convergence, Coordination and Collusion in Se-
curities Regulation: The Latin American Integrated Market, in LAW AND POLICY 
IN LATIN AMERICA: TRANSFORMING COURTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND RIGHTS’ (Pedro 
Fortes, Larissa Boratti, Andrés Palacios Lleras, & Tom Gerald Daly eds., Palgrave 
Macmillan 2017), available at https://perma.cc/B8ND-LZDC. 
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Unius Personae] proposal has already encountered consid-
erable opposition from jurisdictions accustomed to nota-
ries.42 
In addition to the time consumed by registration formalities, the 
process also involves fees. The following Table shows the regional 
ranking of costs and number of days needed for both men and 
women to set up a business venture.  
Table 2. Time and Costs Required to Set Up a Business—World 
Bank Doing Business Index43 
 
 
Pursuant to the same index, Latin America and the Caribbean 
are currently second to last in terms of incorporation costs and time 
required to set up, with only Sub-Saharan Africa behind. Breaking 
down the above data, the World Bank calculates the cost of incor-
porating as a percentage of a person’s income per capita. For exam-
ple, in Mexico a person spends 19 percent of their annual income in 
paying for incorporation expenses.44 In comparison, a person in 
                                                                                                             
 42. Jesper Lau Hansen, The SUP Proposal: Registration and Capital (Arti-
cles 13–17), 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 179 (2015). 
 43. Starting a Business, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma.cc/K52H-
G5GK. 
 44. Starting a Business: Mexico, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma.cc 
/VA38-G5H7. 
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New Zealand would only have to pay 0.3 percent.45 This comparison 
provides an insight into the differences in jurisdictions that have im-
plemented best practices, and those that are still lagging behind. In 
this vein, it provides a route for reform. 
2. Restrictions to Freedom of Contract and Dichotomy of Pri-
vate Law 
The second issue with Latin American company laws is the 
range of unwarranted restrictions to private ordering. The region 
inherited the Napoleonic codifications, in which, following the 19th 
century liberal approaches, the parties were supposed to be granted 
great latitude to govern their legal relationships.46 Notwithstanding 
this, the concept of freedom of contract appears to be very 
restrictive, particularly in the field of Company Law.47 Several 
provisions of public order (ordre public) concerning all aspects of 
corporate governance can be found when reviewing legislation 
throughout the region.48 These include, among others, mandatory 
rules on minority shareholders’ rights, structural changes, 
functioning of corporate bodies, mergers, dissolution, and 
liquidation. The result of this legislative trait is a rise in transaction 
                                                                                                             
 45. Starting a Business: New Zealand, THE WORLD BANK, at https://perma 
.cc/H2UC-BXCW. 
 46. However, even in France, the principles of economic liberalism, which 
were embraced in the 19th century Act of July 24, 1867 on Company Laws (Loi 
du 24 juillet 1867 sur les sociétés commerciales) were harnessed after the 1920s. 
According to Pierre-Henri Conac, the 1929 crisis resulted in a general questioning 
of economic liberalism in favor of a large degree of state intervention in the econ-
omy, which was justified by the market failures, as well as a reduction in the free-
dom of enterprise which was subject to a highly directory legislation. Pierre-Henri 
Conac, La société par actions simplifiée une révolution démocratique, in LA 
SOCIETE PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIEE : BILAN ET PERSPECTIVE 3 (Pierre-Henry Conac 
& Isabelle Urbain-Parleani eds., L.G.D.J. 2016). 
 47. This may be the result of the deeply rooted formalism inherited by the 
region from colonial times. As Mirrow notes, commenting on the excessive reg-
ulation of business associations: “In general, the colonial market was highly reg-
ulated by both royal law and commercial practices.” MIRROW, supra note 40, at 
76. 
 48. The above analysis of excessive formalities in Latin America is in sharp 
contrast with other jurisdictions such as Delaware, where most corporate law rules 
are embodied in default provisions, which may be opted out by the parties. See 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (AEI Press 
1993). 
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costs and legal uncertainty. The following paragraphs explain this 
point further. 
Mandatory rules in company law are all pervasive in the region. 
Consequently, private parties are not always able to adjust their con-
tractual clauses to their particular needs.49 Parties and their advisors 
have to find loopholes and other devices to circumvent certain re-
strictions, which may seem anachronistic today. A short-term solu-
tion found by parties may be to adopt schemes that tend to include 
simulated contracts that do not fully reflect the business reality. As 
a result of these contractual solutions, there is an increase in trans-
action costs, not to mention the uncertainties arising from such 
schemes. Moreover, simulated provisions may even be considered 
wrongful and subject to judicial scrutiny. 
An example of this type of situation is shown in the participation 
of straw men in the process of incorporation whenever the legisla-
tion requires multiple shareholders in order for limited liability to 
exist. This requirement is contrary to contemporary business prac-
tice in which there may be situations where the sole shareholder is 
better suited for certain ends. Company laws throughout the region 
are deeply rooted in ancient legal concepts. The following can ex-
plain this trait50: the Roman law concept of societas, which was later 
developed into different forms of business entities, was strongly 
grounded upon a contractual foundation.51 Later, the French Com-
mercial Code maintained the idea whereby all forms of business as-
sociations arise out of an agreement between two or more persons.52 
                                                                                                             
 49. See REYES, supra note 10, at 18. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Within the classification undertaken by the Roman jurist Gaius, the so-
cietas was included as the last of the so-called consensu contracts. See PASCAL 
PICHONNAZ, LES FONDEMENTS ROMAINS DU DROIT PRIVE 512 (Schultess Verlag 
2008). The societas contract required, inter alia, the participation of two or more 
persons. See id. at 513. 
 52. In spite of this characteristic, the French, primal creators of the contrac-
tual theory, have now fully accepted the benefits derived from the flexibility of 
the French Société par Actions Simplifiée (SAS): 
[The SAS] represents a major breakthrough for French Law, given the 
fact that it is the first time that the legislation accepts a single member 
business corporation in which the capital is divided into shares. It is easy 
to understand the success of this corporate entity in light of the freedom 
provided to the shareholders by the legislation, to define the internal 
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The transplantation of the Napoleonic codifications into Latin 
America resulted in the inception of a full-fledged contractual the-
ory throughout the region.53 Although the experience of several ju-
risdictions around the world has shown the benefits of the sole 
shareholder scheme and the limitations of the strict contract the-
ory,54 surprisingly, some sectors of Latin American academia still 
desperately cling to trite formalism.55 The result has been the wide-
                                                                                                             
rules for the company, and the suppression of a minimum capitalization 
requirement. 
María-Beatríz Salgado, La société par actions simplifiée: una estructura diferente 
en el derecho de sociedades, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 349. 
 53. For Colombia, see CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO (Commercial Code) art. 374 
[C. COM.]; whereby traditional corporations “may not be formed or start operation 
with less than five stockholders.” See id. at art. 98: 
By means of the company contract, two or more persons undertake to 
make a contribution in cash, work, or in other goods representing cur-
rency, for the purpose of sharing in the profits derived from their enter-
prise. On legal formation of a company, it will turn into a juridical person 
distinct from each individual shareholder. 
 54. For a long time, the European Union has recognized the benefits of the 
single member corporation. This trend has found a recent formulation in the So-
cietas Unius Personae:  
One of the most recent initiatives adopted by the European Commission 
in 2014 is the proposed Directive on the Sole Proprietor Limited Liability 
Company, which includes as its highlight the ‘Societas Unius Personae.’ 
Said proposal seems to be an alternative to other initiatives, focused on 
the importance of the European MSME’s in strengthening the EU econ-
omy. 
Linda Navarro Matamoros, Tipologia societaria y derecho de la Unión Europea, 
in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 307. The aim at which the So-
cietas Unius Personae Directive geared is similar to that of the Model Law. It is 
noteworthy that both initiatives focus on MSMEs and have an additional purpose 
of furthering economic integration and harmonization:  
The proposal by the European Commission of a directive on single-
member private limited liability companies of 9 April 2014 is designed 
to facilitate cross-border activities of enterprises, especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by requesting Member States to pro-
vide a company form called the Societas Unius Personae (SUP) that 
would be set up online and would follow harmonised rules on key issues.  
Pierre-Henri Conac, The Societas Unius Personae (SUP): A “Passport” for Job 
Creation and Growth, 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 140 (2015). 
 55. For an example of this trend, see NÉSTOR H. MARTINEZ NEIRA, CÁTEDRA 
DE DERECHO CONTRACTUAL SOCIETARIO ch. 2 (2d ed., Legis 2014). Contrast this 
stance with the forward looking comments by another Colombian scholar, Jorge 
Oviedo Albán: 
Under Colombian Law, by allowing for the creation of single member 
entities under the simplified corporations, it is no longer correct to refer 
now to the ‘corporate contract.’ Today, it is more appropriate to refer to 
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spread prohibition of the single member corporation, making it cum-
bersome for multinational companies and investors alike to have a 
presence in these countries, as they would have to associate with 
other persons or firms in order to carry out the investment.56 
Another problem brought about by the restrictions to freedom of 
contract is standardization. Disregarding the importance of private 
ordering, hinders the development of flexible and useful legal 
schemes that foster innovation and creativity. Consequently, the ac-
tivity of setting up a business entity is reduced to a box ticking and 
blank filling exercise,57 to the detriment of legal innovation involved 
in modern business practices, which require a higher level of flexi-
bility.58 
In addition to reducing mandatory provisions, the simplification 
process heralded by the Model Law also results in reducing transac-
tion costs by eliminating the outdated dichotomy of private law 
throughout the region (meaning the presence of both a civil code and 
a commercial code for the ordering of private matters).59 Indeed, 
                                                                                                             
the ‘corporate juridical act,’ bearing in mind that this concept encom-
passes both contractual corporations and also sole shareholder entities.  
Albán, supra note 25, at 182. 
 56. Naturally, an investor can always set up several subsidiaries outside of 
the Latin American region in order to cope with the multiple member requirement. 
This procedure will entail significant costs. 
 57. For instance, legal information services providers, such as Lexis Nexis 
(or in the Latin American region, Legis), have established form articles of associ-
ation for use by the public in setting up their corporations. For the Legis models 
applicable to Latin America, see Minutos y Modelos, LEGIS, https://perma.cc 
/6C7R-GMRY. 
 58. For example, this situation is contrasted with the French SAS, which is 
the corporate vehicle preferred by tech startups. See Fancisco Reyes & Erik P.M. 
Vermeulen, Company Law, Lawyers and ‘Legal’ Innovation: Common Law ver-
sus Civil Law (Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 2011-3, 2011). 
 59. The dichotomy of private law in Latin America, although currently em-
bodied in two sets of codifications as transplanted from Napoleonic law, has deep 
roots in the region, dating back to colonial time: “Just as the regime of contract 
law was divided amongst the various important sources of civil, commercial, and 
public law, so too was the organization and operation of the various forms of 
business associations.” MIRROW, supra note 40, at 75. Furthermore, it is interest-
ing to note the dispersed and sometimes contradictory nature of statutory rules in 
the region. Mirrow further notes that in the context of laws regulating business 
associations, “[t]he Siete Partidas shared their authority in guiding companies 
with the Ordenanzas de Bilbao, which often provided somewhat different rules.” 
Id. 
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most codes and corporate statutes in the region have maintained a 
differentiation between civil and commercial companies following 
the French 19th century model, whereby separate substantive rules 
apply according to the nature of the business company. 
 Scholars from civil law jurisdictions have commented on this 
point:  
In Chile the criteria to classify a firm as either civil or com-
mercial is related to the definition set forth in its business 
purpose. Therefore, Article 2.059 of the Civil Code man-
dates that ‘the corporation may be either civil or commercial. 
Commercial corporations are those that are formed to carry 
out commercial acts, classified as such by the Law. The re-
maining entities are civil corporations.’ Pursuant to the 
quoted cited article, the classification of a corporation as 
commercial is framed within an external criterion relating to 
purpose clause as set up in the by-laws, at the moment of 
incorporation. If the business purpose entails carrying out 
any of the acts regarded as commercial by Article 3 of the 
Commercial Code the corporation shall be commercial, re-
gardless of the actual business undertaking carried out by the 
corporation.60  
The elimination of this useless differentiation for the simplified 
corporation increases legal certainty in the simplest way possible: 
parties may now be assured of which law applies, without incurring 
either expensive advice or illegality. This certainty reduces transac-
tion costs. 
3. Multiple Piercing the Corporate Veil Hypotheses 
The third issue found in the legislation throughout Latin Amer-
ica is the growing number of exceptions to the principle of limited 
liability. The issue is so problematic that according to some scholars, 
for example in Brazil, piercing the corporate veil has become the 
rule instead of the exception.61 Commenting on this legal trend of 
reducing limited liability, Bruno Salama notes the following:  
                                                                                                             
 60. María Fernanda Vásquez Palma, Sobre los tipos de sociedades en el De-
recho Chileno, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 147. 
 61. In this regard, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at ch. 5. 
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In the period after the adoption of the 1988 [Brazilian] Con-
stitution, the principle of limited liability was radically ad-
justed. Statutory rules and judicial decisions questioning the 
asset partitioning between the firm and its members were is-
sued in virtually all areas of law (including labor law, tax, 
corporate and even consumer protection, as well as adminis-
trative and criminal law). Said decisions reached third par-
ties related to the firm, including directors, contractors or 
counselors, and sometimes even persons having no contrac-
tual relationship with the firm, such as counsel to the share-
holders. In this manner, the basic focus of the legal system 
shifted from protection of entrepreneurs, to protection of 
creditors. The pendulum moved.62 
The erratic case law sometimes encountered throughout the re-
gion is mainly based on situations or regulation arising outside the 
scope of corporate law. Continuing with the Brazilian example, con-
sumer protection laws contain a provision for the disregard of the 
corporate personality whenever the judge finds certain wrongful use 
of the corporate form, in the event of bankruptcy, or even whenever 
it is found that the corporate personality is “somehow a hindrance to 
the reimbursement of losses caused to consumers.”63 However, even 
more noteworthy from the Brazilian case is that the courts have ap-
plied “unlimited shareholder liability in favor of workers by analogy 
to consumer protection legislation.”64 Thus, in Brazil not only is 
there specific legislation on certain causes that may result in veil 
piercing, but the courts have also applied this remedy on the grounds 
of additional unrelated matters. 
The situation is not limited to Brazil. In Colombia, for example, 
a judicial decision from 1992 extended liability for labor obligations 
to shareholders of limited liability companies,65 notwithstanding the 
fact that the Commercial Code explicitly provided for a system of 
                                                                                                             
 62. BRUNO SALAMA, O FIM DA RESPONSABILIDADE LIMITADA NO BRASIL: 
HISTÓRIA, DIREITO E ECONOMIA 26 (Malheiros 2014). 
 63. Unofficial English translation of article 28 of the Código de Proteção e 
Defesa do Consumidor (Consumer Protection Code). 
 64. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at n. 41. 
 65. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación 
Laboral. Nov. 26, 1992. 
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limited liability for this type of entity.66 Additionally, a different de-
cision from the Constitutional Court appears to have extended lia-
bility arising from pension obligations of the subsidiary to a parent 
company, for the mere fact of being the parent.67 The trend to hold 
parent companies liable is also present in legislation throughout the 
region.68 
To be sure, piercing the corporate veil is a valuable remedy in 
corporate law. It cures wrongdoing by controlling shareholders and 
the abuse of the principle of limited liability. However, when this 
solution is extensively applied by courts without sufficient justifica-
tion, it gives rise to legal uncertainty and distrust in the corporate 
form.69 Seen in this light, the proliferation of exceptions (both stat-
utory and judicial) to limited liability throughout the region may 
have the effect of discouraging local and foreign investment.70 
In order to prevent these types of situations, the initiative advo-
cates for a sound balance between the principle of limited liability, 
clearly incorporated in Article 2 of the Model Law,71 and a narrow 
instance of veil piercing, applicable only when the simplified corpo-
ration is used for the purpose of committing fraud or any other 
wrongful act, as stated in Article 41.72 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 66. Article 353 of the Colombian Commercial Code [C. COM] reads as fol-
lows: “the shareholders of a Limited Liability Company shall be liable up to the 
amount of their contributions.” 
 67. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU-
1023, Sept. 26, 2001. However, more recent decisions from the same court appear 
to have produced more certainty by upholding the principle of limited liability of 
corporations. 
 68. REYES, supra note 10, at n. 21, includes the following summary of legis-
lation: for Brazil, see Law no. 6.404, art. 246; for Argentina, see Law no. 24.522, 
art. 161; and for Colombia, see Law no. 1116, 2006, arts. 61, 82. 
 69. Bainbridge has argued that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 
should be abolished, due to its uncertainty and lack of predictability increasing 
transaction costs for small businesses. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil 
Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 470 (2001). 
 70. For an argument against the doctrine of disregarding the corporate veil, 
in the context of Colombia, see Enrique Gaviria Gutiérrez, Contra el Disregard, 
in GRANDES TEMAS DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL MODERNO: SU INCIDENCIA EN LA 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991 (Diké 1993). 
 71. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 2. 
 72. Id. at art. 41. 
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4. Difficult Access to Information Subject to Public Record 
The fourth issue brought about by legislation in the region is the 
limited role of mercantile registries. In this geographic area, the con-
cept of commercial publicity is deemed important in order to pro-
vide legal certainty for acts of business persons.73 However, the ef-
fect of registration in the corporate sphere is restricted to publicity. 
In several cases the act of registration does not by itself result in the 
formation of a corporate body. In fact, additional bureaucratic steps 
are needed in order for a business to acquire legal personality. Aside 
from the registration, certain laws in the region frequently require 
notarization and sometimes even governmental authorizations. 
However, the recent trend in modernization of corporate law 
throughout the world has resulted in legislation, which derogates 
cumbersome multiple incorporation steps.74 
Additionally, the technology used is generally obsolete and ac-
cess becomes complicated. Once again, high transaction costs sur-
face in this area. Formal registration is so complicated that the pro-
cess cannot be completed without the intervention of third parties, 
particularly lawyers, making it even more costly, bureaucratic, and 
less efficient.75 Additionally, this matter is plagued with stern oppo-
                                                                                                             
 73. See REYES, supra note 10, at n. 77 (discussing the different regulations in 
certain countries in the region); for Brazil, see CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code) art. 993 
[C.C.]; for Mexico, see Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [General Law of 
Business Associations] art. 5; for Argentina, see Law no. 19.550, art. 12; and for 
Colombia, see C. COM. art. 112. 
 74. Commenting on the trend to reduce formalism, José Miguel Embid notes 
that: 
[A]side from the fact that [the simplification process] results in eliminat-
ing the effect of several corporate law institutions, which have been de-
veloped over a long time (such as the irregular company and the nullifi-
cation of incorporation, among others), this simplification process re-
veals that only in the context of closely held corporations that the system 
electronic incorporation acquires true meaning and effect. 
José Miguel Embid, El significado de la tipología societaria en el derecho de 
sociedades, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 49. 
 75. The World Bank Doing Business report for 2016 discusses the most com-
mon problems with registration systems, which require third party intervention: 
“Hiring a lawyer is most common in Latin America and the Caribbean—while 
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sition to change the status quo. There is a multimillion-dollar busi-
ness behind formal registration of firms, making it harder to break 
the pattern of formalization in order to achieve simplification of pro-
cedures. 
The Model Law initiative firmly states that incorporation should 
be simple and straightforward. This idea is particularly strong in 
light of the empirical evidence showing that economies with third-
party involvement in the process of incorporation have more busi-
nesses operating in the informal sector.76 Thus, the aim of contrib-
uting to the formal economy is partly achieved by simplifying this 
process. 
According to the World Bank, the golden principle is minimum 
human intervention.77 By removing the participation of people and 
creating a more automatized process, the business owner by herself 
will be able to carry out the procedures to set up a new firm formally. 
The World Bank has analyzed highly inefficient legal systems in 
which the process of incorporation is as complicated as it is costly 
and prepared a graph (Figure 3) that depicts a collection of ex-
tremely complicated steps required for business formalization, evi-
dencing a maximum degree of human intervention. 
                                                                                                             
using a notary’s services is most common in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa.” The World Bank, Do-
ing Business 2016 Report (2016), available at https://perma.cc/DDX2-XDGB 
[hereinafter Doing Business 2016 Report]. 
 76. Id. As shown in the Doing Business report data, high costs for business 
incorporation, especially those incurred through third-party involvement, can 
drive entrepreneurs to choose to operate in the informal sector. 
 77. See the Doing Business report for 2017, arguing that increased trade dig-
italization, which minimizes human interaction, creates fewer opportunities for 
bribery and fraud, using the Philippines as a compelling example in the customs 
sector. The World Bank, Doing Business 2017 Report (2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/Q3S6-AUYQ [hereinafter Doing Business 2017 Report]. 
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Figure 3. World Bank—Procedures for Incorporation Including Hu-
man Intervention78 
 
An example of the cumbersome ritualism in Latin American 
company law is the resolution rendered by a former Inspector of 
Justice in Argentina, according to which, parties to a corporate con-
tract had to prove that the paid-in capital had been contributed to the 
company through the delivery of cash to the corporate officer.79  
                                                                                                             
 78. Doing Business 2016 Report, supra note 75. 
 79. The Argentinian Inspection of Justice is an agency entitled with the su-
pervision of business corporations in the city of Buenos Aires. The Inspection is 
empowered to issue resolutions concerning the formation and operation of busi-
ness corporations within that region. Proof of actual capital contributions must be 
brought before the National Inspection of Justice. General Resolution no. 7 of 
2005 describes a rather unusual requirement for this purpose. According to its 
wording:  
The payment [of capital] must be accredited in the legal proportion de-
termined in the act of incorporation. Evidence of payment must be pro-
vided by deposit with the Argentinian National Bank . . . . Alternatively, 
proof of payment may also be provided through: 1. The explicit assertion 
by a notary public, in the public deed of incorporation, stating that the 
shareholders have effectively delivered the capital to the firm’s directors, 
in the presence of the notary public. Alternatively, the public deed may 
contain an assertion in the sense that the capital has been delivered to the 
notary public herself, with the further obligation of transferring said 
funds to the firm’s directors, after formal incorporation has taken place  
. . . . 
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This procedure had to be certified by a notary public. In the alterna-
tive, the parties were bound to deposit such capital contributions in 
the National Bank. This is contrasted with the example of New Zea-
land or Kenya, as already discussed, where registration is carried out 
online and is completed within only a few hours.  
5. Enforcement Failure 
The fifth problem posed by Latin American legislation is the 
lack of effective enforcement mechanisms throughout the jurisdic-
tions in the region. This situation can be analyzed under the prism 
of Roscoe Pound’s seminal ideas. At the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, Pound posed the question of legal efficiency by contrasting law 
in the books with law in action.80 The empirical observation in Latin 
America shows the obsolescence of the court system.81 As a conse-
quence, judicial enforcement of contracts is highly inefficient.82 One 
of the prime causes of the region’s judicial delays is the fact that the 
law is overly ritualistic and plagued with several procedural devices 
that allow parties to challenge almost every decision that is ren-
dered. As a result, the processes are lengthy and their outcome is 
highly uncertain. This situation gives rise to a significant degree of 
unpredictability and requires parties to design contractual provisions 
that are self-enforcing, outside of the ordinary court system. 
                                                                                                             
Resolución General de la Inspección General de Justicia, in Nueva Regulación 
de la Inspección General de Justicia, Resolución Número 7 de 2005 y anexos 
(Aug. 23, 2005), Ediciones Gari, 2006, at 95. 
 80. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 
(1910). 
 81. See Doing Business 2017 Report, supra note 77, at 190, 195, 199, 200, 
224. 
 82. Ronald J. Gilson notes that emerging jurisdictions sometimes display a 
broader scope of legal deficiencies, beyond merely lacking minority protection 
rules: 
With bad commercial law, exchange must be self-enforcing because 
there are neither authoritative rules nor an effective judicial system to 
enforce those obligations. Transactions in this circumstance take place 
in a reputation market, which substitutes for law (or law’s shadow) as a 
means to assure that parties perform their contractual obligations. 
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: An-
choring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2007). 
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The following chart shows the difficulty of the enforcement of 
contracts in the region. 




Processes              





(% of claim) 
Argentina 11.5 660 22.5 
Brazil 13 731 20.7 
Chile 9 480 28.6 
Colombia 9 1,288 45.8 
Mexico 9.5 350 33.5 
 
Aside from the transaction costs imposed on parties by the Kaf-
kaesque proceedings, another primal cause of inefficiencies is the 
fact that, normally, there are no specialized corporate law courts in 
the region. In general, it is fair to say that Latin American jurisdic-
tions lack what Professor Luca Enriques refers to as “good corporate 
judges.”84 As a result, case management is not well developed and 
there is no specific regulation concerning time standards for the pro-
ceedings. Additionally, court automation is underdeveloped, to say 
the least, causing delays by failing to make use of existing technol-
ogies to facilitate the different instances within the legal process. 
The following diagram presents the main areas of focus by the 
                                                                                                             
 83. Doing Business 2017 Report, supra note 77, at 190, 195, 199, 200, 224. 
 84. See Luca Enriques, Off the Books, but on the Record: Evidence from Italy 
on the Relevance of Judges to the Quality of Corporate Law, in GLOBAL 
MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A 
NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 258 et seq. (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., Columbia 
U. Press 2003). The characteristics of good corporate judges are as follows:      
“1. Honesty, rapidity, and expertise . . . . 2. No deference in conflict-of-interest 
cases . . . . 3. Capacity to identify real rights and wrongs . . . . 4. Antiformalism      
. . . . 5. Concern for spill-over effects.” Id. at 7-9. Additionally, Enriques summa-
rizes these traits: “At the most basic level, there is widespread agreement that a 
certain degree of judicial honesty and effectiveness . . . are necessary elements of 
a sound corporate law system . . . . Their absence is a real problem today mainly 
in developing countries . . . .” Id. at 3. 
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Doing Business Index when evaluating the quality of the proceed-
ings. The difficulties associated with the judicial system have been 
meticulously assessed by the World Bank in its Doing Business Re-
port. For this purpose, the Bank carefully analyses the basic aspects 
that could lead to an efficient judicial system. Among the most rel-
evant, the following factors are considered: (i) the availability of 
specialized courts; (ii) the regulations concerning the timeframe for 
each procedural instance; (iii) the access to automated systems for 
filing complaints and serving notices, and (iv) the existence of alter-
native dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
Figure 4. Areas Covered by the Quality of Judicial Processes In-
dex85 
 
As a result of the court inefficiency described above, costs are 
prohibitively high when litigating in the region, both in terms of 
monetary expenditure and time spent. For example, according to the 
Doing Business report for Mexico, in 2017 the cost of enforcing a 
contract before the judiciary, as a percentage of the claim, rises to 
33.5 percent.86 As a consequence, a contracting party wishing to 
have its contract enforced will lose almost half of the amount 
                                                                                                             
 85. Doing Business 2016 Report, supra note 75. 
 86. See Ease of Doing Business in Mexico: Enforcing Contracts, THE WORLD 
BANK, at https://perma.cc/P2AH-9ZHF. 
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claimed in the court proceedings (if successful).87 The difference 
between law in books and law in action throughout the region is de-
scribed by the distinguished scholar Robert Charles Means in the 
following excerpt: “the tendency for Latin American countries to 
enact laws with little regard for social reality and less for effective 
implementation is well known . . . . This kind of isolation of legal 
rules from reality might be called enforcement unreality.”88  
In the same vein, Bruno Salama and Viviane Muller describe 
this scenario, capturing many of the problems present throughout 
the region by using Brazil as an example:  
Brazilian courts are largely deemed by corporate lawyers 
and other market players to lack the necessary expertise to 
delve into the intricacies of securities laws and the economic 
dynamics of securities transactions. This trait can be partly 
attributed to the absence of courts and judges specialized in 
corporate and securities transactions. In fact, Brazilian 
courts are remarkably slow and their decisions on corporate 
matters are somewhat unpredictable.89 
6. Costs of Starting a Business  
Another problem with the current legislative approach is the ex-
pense associated with the creation of a business. Figure 5 below 
shows the average cost related to starting a business by focusing 
mostly on bureaucratic expenses that the entrepreneur must incur in 
order to set up a formal business structure. As may be seen from the 
graph, the costs of incorporating in the region are significant. This 
situation is particularly worrisome when bearing in mind that busi-
ness startups already require large amounts of capital up front. Busi-
nesspersons should not have to divert their scarce resources into 
complying with bureaucratic formalities. It is noteworthy that the 
highest costs seen below do not relate to the operation of the busi-
ness itself, but are solely incurred in legal formalities. 
                                                                                                             
 87. Obviously, if the claiming party is not successful, she would spend the 
equivalent to half of her claim and a significant amount of time. 
 88. See ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW: CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA 151 (U. of North Carolina Press 1980). 
 89. See Salama & Muller, supra note 30, at 178. 
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Figure 5. The Costs of Opening a Business90 
This situation is in contrast with more advanced systems in 
which businesspersons are able to focus their resources (financial 
and other) on developing their business, rather than in complying 
with costly formalisms. Therefore, in many cases there is no need to 
resort to lawyers and other professionals in order to complete the 
incorporation process. 
III. CONTENTS OF THE MODEL LAW 
The Model Law is inspired by the Colombian SAS. Reference 
to the Colombian experience is, thus, crucial in understanding the 
main aspects of the initiative. In December of 2008, the Colombian 
Congress enacted Law 1258 of 2008, creating this new type of busi-
ness. The Colombian law contains elements found in corporate law 
coming from both the common law and civil law traditions. In fact, 
the basic structure and contents of the law are based on the French 
legislation on the société par actions simplifiée.91 Additionally, cer-
tain American law elements, mainly from the state of Delaware, 
                                                                                                             
 90. Doing Business 2016 Report, supra note 75. 
 91. The original legislation of the French SAS was enacted in 1994 (Law no. 
94-1, Jan. 3, 1994). Several reforms followed to make it even more flexible and 
simplified. For an overview of this type of business entity, see PIERRE-HENRI 
CONAC & ISABELLE URBAIN-PARLEANI, LA SOCIÉTÉ PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIÉE 
(SAS) (Dalloz 2016). 
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were also included in the statute.92 The result is a closely held cor-
poration that resembles the so-called uncorporations that have been 
introduced into the United States, the United Kingdom and some 
civil law jurisdictions.93 
It is also noteworthy that there have been other similar laws in-
troducing regulation on simplified closely held corporate vehicles in 
Latin America. The first legislation of the sort was the Chilean Law 
20.190 of June 5, 2007. According to Chilean commentator María 
José Viveros Bloch, this legislation was aimed at allowing the small 
business owner to formalize her venture.94 On the other hand, Mex-
ico enacted a law on December 9, 2015 regarding sociedades anóni-
mas simplificadas (simplified corporations). The most recent case is 
the Argentinian adoption of the sociedad por acciones simplificada 
with Law 27.349,95 which incorporated in the law designed to en-
courage entrepreneurship (Title 3). There is also draft legislation on 
various types of similar business entities in Brazil.  
By providing a combination of corporate and partnership-like 
components, the Colombian SAS allows for significant contractual 
flexibility, while still preserving the benefits of limited liability and 
asset partitioning. As an example, some of the partnership-like fea-
tures include simple formation procedures, internal flexibility and 
share transfer restrictions. These features allow businesspersons to 
cope better with agency problems within the corporations in which 
management has been delegated.96 On the other hand, certain crucial 
                                                                                                             
 92. See ROMANO, supra note 48. 
 93. See Reyes & Vermeulen, supra note 58; see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 6. 
 94. See MARÍA JOSÉ VIVEROS BLOCH, SOCIEDAD POR ACCIONES: ANÁLISIS DE 
UN NUEVO TIPO SOCIAL 44 (Librotecnia 2006) (for the summary of the Chilean 
law’s objectives). 
 95. Published in the Official Bulletin on Apr. 12, 2017. 
 96. By allowing a higher degree of contractual flexibility, parties are enabled 
to set up devices aimed at defining ex ante each of the corporate participants’ 
obligations and rights. This latitude is oriented towards the completion of the cor-
porate contract, reducing the potential for exposed disputes. For a discussion re-
garding the incomplete contract theory, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, 
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design 56 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 187 (2005). 
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corporate features, like having a separate legal personality and con-
tinuity of life, have also been kept.97 
The Model Law contains a total of 43 articles regulating all 
stages in the life span of the corporation. As with any other model 
law, its provisions are intended to serve as a guide for legislators and 
policymakers alike. Therefore, they can be adapted in order to make 
them compatible with domestic legislation. The following is a short 
discussion of the main traits of the Model Law, inspired by the Co-
lombian SAS. 
A. Facilitating Incorporation Procedures 
Following an Anglo-American approach to corporate law, the 
Model Law significantly reduces formalities for incorporation. 
Many of the proceedings existing in Latin American countries are 
reminiscent of ancient formalities that have been abandoned in other 
jurisdictions. Therefore, streamlining the requirements to set up the 
business by removing some of these cumbersome steps is not in-
compatible with legal certainty. Interestingly, the latter goal can be 
reached through a simple filing procedure before a public registry 
(such as a chamber of commerce). 
Article 5 of the Model Law reads as follows: “A simplified stock 
corporation will be formed by contract or by the individual will of a 
single shareholder, provided that a written document is granted. The 
formation document shall be registered before the Mercantile Reg-
istry . . . .” 
The same article also lists a total of seven items, which normally 
form part of the incorporation document.98 This requirement is not 
intended to create an unjustified burden on the parties, but instead is 
aimed at the disclosure of basic corporate information. The article 
contains minimum legal requirements such as the corporation’s 
domicile, its name, and the subscribed capital, among a few others. 
It is basic information designed to identify the business entity, so 
                                                                                                             
 97. These characteristics allow for limited liability and indefinite duration of 
the business enterprise. 
 98. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5. 
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that third parties can deal with it confidently. The same Model Law 
provision categorically mandates that “no additional formalities of 
any nature shall be required for the formation of the simplified stock 
corporation.”99 Even more significant is the removal of the notary 
public’s intervention in the process. This recommendation is geared 
towards the suppression of intermediaries and the reduction of un-
necessary costs (including monetary and time related expenses). 
Furthermore, the Model Law provides certainty as to when legal 
personality arises. Article 3 states that “[u]pon the filing of the for-
mation document before the Mercantile Registry . . . , the simplified 
stock corporation will form a legal entity separate and distinct from 
its shareholders.”100 This simplification is intended to settle the dis-
cussion concerning the precise moment in which the legal personal-
ity is acquired. Where the law requires several different steps for the 
incorporation to be completed, as is frequently the case in Latin 
America, it becomes difficult to tell when the process has come to 
fruition. Under the Model Law, all incorporation formalities are re-
duced to a filing before the mercantile registry.101 Such registration 
partly covers the functions previously served to the intervention of 
notary publics. Experience has shown that there is no practical need 
in having two sets of formal procedures (granting of a public deed 
of incorporation, and filing before the mercantile registry) directed 
towards the same end. Thus, the Model Law has granted the mer-
cantile registry with certain attestation functions over the incorpora-
tion documents filed.102 The mercantile registry shall only provide 
a review of the legality of the provisions set in the incorporation 
documents, and may only deny registration where it finds that the 
elements enumerated in Article 5 of the Model Law have not been 
included.103 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. at art. 5. 
 100. Id. at art. 3. 
 101. This feature appears in other jurisdictions, including some in the United 
States, whereby filing before the registry acts as a presumption as to the existence 
of the corporate body. See ABA, REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
(2006) Section 106. 
 102. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 6. 
 103. Id. at art. 8. 
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Following the underlying concern with simplification and cost 
reduction, a system of online registration should be implemented. In 
Colombia, certain local mercantile registries have implemented an 
electronic system for the formation of simplified corporation.104 The 
system requires the incorporator to have a personal digital signature 
which can also be acquired through an online application system.105 
All these electronic devices find solid legal grounds in Colombia, 
given the early adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on elec-
tronic commerce, by Law 527 of 1999. This law incorporated the 
principle of functional equivalence, whereby any data message is 
sufficient to replace paper-based formalities at least concerning so-
called private documents (i.e., those that are not subject to notariza-
tion or any other form of authentication by a public officer).106 
B. Full-Fledged Limited Liability 
The Model Law reinforces the foundational principle of limited 
liability by including legal provisions directed at ameliorating the 
impact of the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine. Accordingly, 
the few exceptions to limited liability are reserved exclusively to 
situations where there is clear and sufficient evidence of an abusive 
use of the corporate form, provided that the liable party has acted 
wrongfully or in a fraudulent fashion. 
There is an attempt in the Model Law to strike a balance between 
asset partitioning on the one hand, and the extension of liability to 
                                                                                                             
 104. The following web page may be accessed to incorporate the simplified 
corporation electronically, Constitución de Sociedades por Acciones Simplifica-
das (SAS), CAMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTÁ, https://perma.cc/5MV7-ZXEK 
(under “Constitución Virtual de SAS,” follow “Constituir” hyperlink). 
 105. The digital signature may be acquired filing out the necessary forms in 
the following web page, Adquiera o renueve su firma digital, CERTICÁMARA, 
https://perma.cc/T7AJ-J9GN. 
 106. In accordance with Article 6 of Law 527 of 1999, where a legal provision 
requires that information be in writing, such requirement shall be complied with 
by means of a data message, provided that the information contained therein is 
accessible for its future consultation. The use of new technologies has been de-
scribed by scholars as one of the factors modernizing Corporate Law: “The pro-
gressive use of new technologies has been one of the factors accompanying the 
process of typology renovation in the closely held corporation, with the aim of 
facilitating and simplifying its existence, organization and operation.” Embid, su-
pra note 74, at 48. 
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responsible parties.107 The economic rationale for the limitation of 
liability and the instances of veil piercing have been broadly dis-
cussed by renowned scholars.108 Following the mainstream ap-
proach to these principles, one of the objectives of the Model Law 
in this regard is to provide an appropriate remedy for the aggrieved 
when the legal entity status has been severely eroded. The initiative 
thus intends to limit the situations for judges to hold shareholders 
liable for the company’s obligations. Fraud or misuse of the corpo-
rate form should be the sole events to trigger judicial intervention.109 
There appears to be no valid justification introducing so many ex-
ceptions to the principle of limited liability. There is a willingness 
to counteract the wholesale disregard of the legal entity in view of 
the many cases where the exception to the principle of limited lia-
bility becomes the rule. This is particularly true when case law is 
founded to a large extent upon situations unrelated to the domain of 
corporate law.  
The region’s writs of constitutionality (mandado de segurança 
in Brazil, acción de amparo in Mexico and Argentina, and acción 
de tutela in Colombia) have been used on several occasions as a 
mechanism for piercing the corporate veil. This type of litigation 
threatens the economic foundations of corporate law. This way, “de-
fending weak creditors through expeditious writs (in which the true 
merits of each case are not carefully assessed by constitutional 
courts) negatively impacts certainty and reasonable reliance on these 
legal systems.”110 The Brazilian experience must serve as an im-
portant warning for the region, given the precedents that have jeop-
ardized the economic benefits arising from the principle of limited 
liability. In the opinion of Salama, the Brazilian trend of allowing 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Model Law, supra note 1, at arts. 2, 41. 
 108. See among many other works: FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 40 (Harvard U. Press 1996); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. (1991); Bainbridge, supra note 69; Robert B. 
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. (1991); PIERRE MOUSSERON, DROIT DES SOCIET S 79 (2d ed., Montchrestien 
2005); SALAMA, supra note 62. 
 109. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 41. 
 110. REYES, supra note 10, at 21. 
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the government radical involvement in the allocation and realloca-
tion of corporate risks was eventually consolidated. As a result of 
that, additional legal branches were introduced to better protect the 
interests of certain groups. Therefore, new fields of the law ap-
peared, such as environmental law, consumer, labor law, social se-
curity law, urbanistic law, and others.111 
Similarly, it has been widely held that upholding the principle of 
limited liability is a plausible objective, particularly when facing 
voluntary creditors.112 Currently there does not seem to be a major 
dispute on this topic. On the other hand, regarding the so-called in-
voluntary creditors, there is an ongoing doctrinal debate as to 
whether the principle should also prevail in tort cases.113 Notwith-
standing the scholarly debate surrounding these topics, there is no 
differentiation in the Model Law concerning the situation just de-
scribed. The legal entity can be judicially disregarded in the excep-
tions already discussed. 
C. Private Ordering 
The Model Law upholds the principle of freedom of contract be-
tween private parties. This marks a defining trait of modern corpo-
rate law, particularly regarding hybrid business forms.114 Upon dis-
cussing the French SAS, Périn and Germain, single out a distinctive 
feature of the simplified corporation which lies in the possibility to 
adjust internal functioning, enabling shareholders to benefit from 
both corporate characteristics and added flexibility: “The method of 
internal organization confers the SAS its originality vis-à-vis other 
types of company. The simplified corporation is a liberalized form 
                                                                                                             
 111. See SALAMA, supra note 62, at 356. 
 112. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 108. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Commenting the Colombian SAS legislation, local scholars note: “To-
day, there is consensus in Colombia of the fact that the Law 1258 of 2008 is the 
most important reform to Corporate Law of the last decade. The SAS was created 
based on the pillar of corporate flexibility by incorporating, in its majority default 
rules.” William Hernandez, La sociedad por acciones simplificada en Colombia, 
in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, supra note 25, at 204 (citations omitted). 
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of moral person, which includes the financial benefits from the cor-
porate form, with a vast autonomy to define its internal powers.”115 
The flexibility provided by the Model Law is characteristic of 
best practices from both the common law and civil law traditions. 
As noted above, a broad freedom for parties to define their legal re-
lationships is pervasive in American corporate law.116 Likewise, the 
1994 French law on SAS, along with its numerous amendments is a 
good example of private ordering. According to Philippe Merle: 
“The novelty introduced by the SAS consists in granting absolute 
preponderance to freedom of contract for the shareholders, as man-
ifested in the by-laws. The application of legal provisions may be 
opted out of by contracting parties.”117 
As has already been explained, the simplified corporation intro-
duced by the Model Law is barred from listing its securities in a 
stock exchange. This is due to the need to maintain the Model Law 
regulation as flexible and enabling for businesspersons. In fact, 
keeping it away from the securities markets removes the difficult 
issues concerning the protection of dispersed investors as there is a 
close relationship between ownership and control in the simplified 
corporation.118  
                                                                                                             
 115. PIERRE-LOUIS PÉRIN & MICHEL GERMAIN, SAS - LA SOCIÉTÉ PAR 
ACTIONS SIMPLIFIÉE : ÉTUDES-FORMULES 3 (3d ed., Joly Éditions 2008). 
 116. Noting the increasing flexibility awarded to close corporations by judges 
and legislators in the United States, Palmiter and Partnoy state that: 
For many years, planners of the close corporation confronted judicial an-
tagonism to special arrangements-whether embodied in the articles, by-
laws, or a separate agreement if they departed too far from the traditional 
statutory model. Two parallel developments, starting mostly in the 
1960s, have substantially loosened this judicial attitude. First, courts 
have become more realistic about the special demands of close corpora-
tions and have become far more tolerant of departures from the norm. 
Second, legislatures have recognized the unnecessary rigidity of the tra-
ditional structure and have created special rules for the close corporation. 
PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 31, at 1005. See also ROMANO, supra note 48; 
and the ABA, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (2006). 
 117. PHILIPPE MERLE, DROIT COMMERCIAL : SOCIETES COMMERCIALES 602 
(5th ed., Précis Dalloz 1996). 
 118. Commenting on the approach adopted in the United States, Professor 
Bainbridge notes: “The regulatory regime for statutory close corporations is sub-
stantially more liberal in a variety of ways than is mainstream corporate law.” 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 486 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2015). 
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The prohibition to offer securities on an exchange does not im-
ply that the simplified corporation cannot be used to undertake large 
business projects, or that it is to be adopted exclusively by MSMEs. 
It is likely that the flexible capital structure is the most attractive 
element of the entity for large firms. This flexibility allows for dif-
ferent types of investors, some active and some passive, and is gen-
erally regarded as adequate for large business groups and tax plan-
ning.119 
In the absence of the simplified corporation, Latin American 
MSMEs are subject to a challenging dilemma. On the one hand, they 
could choose the traditional corporate form in Latin America (gen-
erally the sociedad anónima), benefitting from its features, but as-
suming the downside of stringent rules and formalities.120 On the 
other hand, they could adopt partnership-like entities which provide 
wide flexibility, but are subject to the disadvantage of unlimited li-
ability. The simplified corporation combines the benefits from both 
types of business entities. Cozian notes the following regarding the 
French law on SAS: “The fundamental idea is to offer members of 
                                                                                                             
 119. As an example of the benefits provided by this flexibility, the following 
is noted: 
The Model Law enables the corporation to issue classes and series of 
shares. The distinction between these two concepts has obvious practical 
consequences. Share ‘classes’ refer to various categories of instruments 
that are differentiated on the basis of the inherent rights associated with 
them, according to the relevant regulation. On the other hand, the ‘series’ 
identify successive issues of the same class of shares, where such shares 
have been placed at different time periods. Finally, Article 10 of the 
Model Law also contemplates that the company may issue shares ‘for 
any consideration whatsoever, including in-kind contributions, or in ex-
change for labor contributions pursuant to the terms and conditions con-
tained in the by-laws.’ 
REYES, supra note 10, at 114. 
 120. The French simplified corporation was partly adopted with the objective 
of establishing a corporate vehicle, which is free from the formalities of the classic 
corporation (Société Anonyme or S.A.): 
The S.A. bears the inconvenient of requiring at least seven shareholders, 
and having a complex system establishing the existence of a general 
shareholders assembly, board of directors, and director general. None of 
these are required in the SAS . . . to sum up, the SAS counts with all the 
advantages of the classic S.A. (limited liability, share transfers etc.), 
without the inconveniences of said entity (minimum shareholders re-
quirement, internal organization). 
JEROME BONNARD, DROIT DES SOCIETES 126-127 (3d ed., Hachette Supérieur 
1999). 
44                  JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 11 
 
the simplified corporation an organizational form very similar to the 
‘company-contract’ (société contrat), where the essential function-
ing rules are provided by agreement between the parties. This way, 
the rules of the corporation (société anonyme) may be opted out 
of.”121 
The initiative contains default provisions which the parties may 
opt into, or opt out of at their will. Consequently, business partici-
pants can implement almost any arrangement which they deem bet-
ter suited to their business needs.122 Some examples of these provi-
sions in the Model Law are the possibility for shareholders to either 
fully define the main business activities of the corporation, or set up 
an open ended purpose clause whereby the corporation may engage 
in any lawful business;123 the possibility for the corporation to have 
an unlimited life span;124 freedom to organize the internal structure 
and operation of the corporation;125 leeway to define voting majori-
ties for a shareholders meeting,126 among others. 
                                                                                                             
 121. MAURICE COZIAN ET AL., DROIT DES SOCIETES 365 (18th ed., LexisNexis 
2005). Périn and Germain note the following regarding the French SAS: 
“[A]dding freedom of contract to the creation of a corporation constitutes an un-
precedented privilege in French Law. For any rational agent, incorporating her 
firm as an SAS corresponds to the desire to increase organizational efficiency, by 
having it adapt to its shareholders particular needs.” PÉRIN & GERMAIN, supra 
note 115, at 11. The same characteristic is present in the Colombian SAS whereby 
decision on the internal configuration of governance organs is left to the will of 
the shareholder(s). 
 122. Private ordering is an important feature introduced by the Colombian 
SAS law, into the previously rigid Colombian Corporate Law: 
Naturally, the SAS’ opt in approach also allows for private parties to step 
out of the standard provisions contained in model by laws and to draft 
sophisticated agreements that are appropriate for more complex under-
takings. The enabling non-directory provisions of Law 1258 have fos-
tered private ordering and sparked innovation in Corporate Law across 
the country. Aside from the boilerplate type of agreements that are used 
by most start-ups, practicing attorneys are becoming skillful at develop-
ing new legal structures suitable for a more sophisticated business envi-
ronment. A survey conducted with law firms and sole law practitioners 
in the capital city of Bogotá has allowed for the identification of several 
legal structures in which one or more SAS can be properly used for an 
unlimited number of business purposes. 
Francisco Reyes, Corporate Governance in Latin America: A Functional Analy-
sis, 39 U. OF MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (2008). 
 123. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5(5). 
 124. Id. at art. 5(4). 
 125. Id. at art. 17. 
 126. Id. at art. 22. 
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The approach based on the primacy of private ordering assumes 
that contracting parties will be diligent enough either to adequately 
negotiate the terms of the agreement so as to suit their particular 
needs, or to adapt by default to off the rack housekeeping rules pro-
vided in the corporate statute. Naturally, the fact that there is signif-
icant latitude for parties to define the structure of their corporation 
also entails a burden to prevent unintended consequences by careful 
negotiation of provisions from the outset.127 For example, incorpo-
rators may wish to establish special supermajorities which differ 
from those contained as fallback provisions, in case they desire to 
implement their voting arrangements. Depending on the specific cir-
cumstances, parties need to carefully design their own agreement in 
order to fit their needs. 
D. Unrestricted Business Purpose, Perpetuity and Commercial 
Character 
The Model Law allows for the adoption of an unrestricted busi-
ness purpose for any Simplified Corporation.128 This characteristic 
coincides with the trend of advanced jurisdictions such as the United 
States,129 and to a lesser extent, the EU130 and the UK.131 By means 
                                                                                                             
 127. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 
(Foundation Press 2002). 
 128. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5(5). 
 129. Palmiter and Partnoy explain the evolution and fallout of the ultra vires 
doctrine in the United States: “In the nineteenth century, the law of corporations 
was mainly devoted to the resolution of disputes arising under the ultra vires doc-
trine. Today the issue rarely arises. Clearly, the original purpose of the doctrine 
to curb the powers of large corporations has failed, largely replaced by expanded 
fiduciary duties.” PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 31, at 171. 
 130. Commenting on the first European company law Directive, it has been 
asserted that: 
Even though this directive notes that the corporation’s legal capacity is 
defined by the purpose clause as set forth in the relevant articles of in-
corporation, it also underscores that innocent third parties are protected 
vis-à-vis the validity of ultra vires business transactions to which they 
were a party—provided they did not know that the corporation lacked 
sufficient capacity to undertake such a transaction. Pursuant to the same 
directive, bad faith will not be presumed solely on the grounds that the 
relevant party had access to a certificate issued by the relevant company 
registry, in which the purpose clause is described. 
REYES, supra note 10, at 31. 
 131. See the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 (c.46), at 31(1). 
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of this provision, the anachronistic ultra vires doctrine that still ex-
ists in many Latin American countries is altogether left behind. Said 
doctrine is supposed to protect shareholders from the presumed ex-
cess of powers which managers may sometimes arrogate upon them-
selves by acting beyond the terms of their mandate. According to 
this view, establishing limitations to the capacity of the corporation 
ensures that the entity will only be liable for acts that are explicitly 
provided for in the corporate documents. 
However, modern corporate law across the board tends to disre-
gard the usefulness of this doctrine. It has been asserted that the pro-
hibition of ultra vires acts may be deemed too formalistic and detri-
mental to entrepreneurial activity.132 This doctrine may even tend to 
create legal uncertainty, as it subjects contracting third parties acting 
in good faith, to the nullification of contracts with the corporation. 
In fact, the corporation can always challenge its own acts on the 
grounds that it lacked sufficient legal capacity to execute them. 
The trend against this doctrine may also take into consideration 
the ownership structures prevailing in Latin America. As already 
explained, closely held family enterprises, with no separation be-
tween ownership and control, are common in the region. This may 
render the ultra vires doctrine useless, given the fact that sharehold-
ers may themselves assert direct control over the day-to-day running 
of the company.133 On the other hand, the ample flexibility con-
tained in the Model Law allows shareholders to either choose an un-
restricted business purpose, or to introduce limitations thereto. 
Additionally, the Model Law introduced the perpetuity of exist-
ence theory, which runs contrary to many Latin American legisla-
tions. Most corporate laws in the region have maintained a Napole-
onic provision whereby a company should be created for a limited 
                                                                                                             
 132. See FRANCISCO REYES, DERECHO SOCIETARIO 299 (3d ed., Editorial 
Temis 2016). 
 133. Palmiter and Partnoy however hold that there is still a place for the ultra 
vires doctrine in closed corporations; See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 31, 
at 172. The present paper suggests quite the contrary: by having shareholders ac-
tively participating in the day-to-day management of the closely held corporation, 
their scrutiny of directors’ actions renders the protection of the ultra vires doctrine 
useless. 
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duration.134 The objective is to reduce outdated formalities and in-
troduce more flexibility for entrepreneurs.135 
The initiative also intends to put an end to the anachronistic di-
chotomy of private law present throughout the region. The Model 
Law mandates that the simplified corporation is to have a commer-
cial nature—without regard to the objects or purposes set forth in 
the relevant incorporation documents.136 Consequently, it becomes 
irrelevant to analyze whether the business association’s activities 
have a civil or a commercial nature. This characteristic is intended 
to provide the maximum amount of legal certainty for shareholders 
and for parties contracting with the simplified corporation. 
E. Freedom to Define Internal Structure 
With the aim of introducing more flexibility for the benefit of 
businesspersons, the formation and operation of internal governance 
organs are also simplified in the Model Law. As well as achieving a 
streamlining of procedures and eliminating unnecessary bureau-
cracy, this characteristic arguably reduces costs for the entrepreneur. 
An example of this leeway can be seen in the board of directors 
regulation contained in the initiative. Under the Model Law there is 
no statutory obligation to create a board of directors.137 Even though 
the importance of said body for the management of corporations is 
acknowledged, regulatory restrictions have been loosened to the 
point where shareholders may even decide if they require such a 
board or not. For instance, small business ventures may find benefits 
in excluding the board altogether. This feature specifically responds 
to the already analyzed fact that most companies in Latin America 
                                                                                                             
 134. The former art. 1865 of the French Civil Code [C. CIV.] established that 
the corporation would be terminated by the expiration of the term for which it was 
contracted (now art. 1838, Law no. 78-9, Jan. 4, 1978). The Law no. 66-537 of 
July 24, 1966 contained a provision whereby corporations could not be formed 
for a term exceeding 99 years. 
 135. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 5(4). 
 136. Id. at art. 1. 
 137. Id. at art. 25. 
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are closely held, and thus do not reflect the idea of a separation be-
tween ownership and control.138 
In the event the incorporators determine that there will not be 
any board of directors in the corporation, both the management and 
direction shall be entirely allocated on the legal representative and 
any of her subordinates. In accordance with Article 25 of the Model 
Law, “in the absence of a provision requiring the operation of a 
board of directors, the legal representative appointed by the share-
holders assembly shall be entitled to exercise any and all powers 
concerning the management and legal representation of the simpli-
fied stock corporation.” At the moment of incorporation or at any 
point during the corporation’s life span, additional committees may 
be created such as management, audit, or any other that the parties 
deem necessary. 
This flexibility is not restricted to the creation of governance or-
gans, but also to the applicable rules for their operation. There is 
thus ample freedom for shareholders to determine aspects such as 
calling of meeting, quorum, voting majorities, and shareholders’ 
representation, among others.139 
This flexibility will be particularly beneficial for MSMEs, as 
their owners will have leeway to decide whether a corporate organ 
such as the board of directors is excluded, instead of having to set 
up mandatory corporate bodies with the only purpose of complying 
with cumbersome legal ritualism. 
F. Rules on Capital 
New provisions on capital and classes of stock are also included. 
The capital structure of the simplified corporation allows for any 
                                                                                                             
 138. See GORGA, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 139. For example, it is clear that this freedom of determination would benefit 
different types of shareholding configurations. When two shareholders wish to 
have shared management and direction of the corporation a single-member board 
may prove helpful, particularly when the manager is different from the sole direc-
tor. Such a system enables those shareholders to divide the corporation’s direct 
management by granting binding authority to the legal representative and over-
sight powers to the single board member. In fact, in corporations with two share-
holders and symmetrical capital contributions, this may be a suitable structure 
because it allows the exercise of reciprocal controls. 
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imaginable form of equity financing. Rules are introduced, for ex-
ample, to set up either ordinary or dual classes of voting shares, in-
cluding multiple voting rights. Contributions in kind or in labor are 
also permitted in the simplified corporation. The flexibility afforded 
by the Model Law is in sharp contrast with formalistic restrictions 
on capitalization in the region. Article 9 of the SAS Model Law con-
tains rules that are a departure from the general rule that has typi-
cally been included in commercial codes throughout Latin America. 
Specifically, Article 9 enables business parties to define the amounts 
for the corporation’s authorized, subscribed and paid-in capital. Fur-
thermore, the term provided in the Model Law for the payment of 
any capital contributions can be made within the following two 
years, from the moment in which the shares of stock were sub-
scribed.140 
An additional feature that is closer to the partnership regime than 
to corporate law, relates to transfer restrictions that can be included 
in the corporation’s by-laws. In this sense, shareholders may be re-
quired to submit any transfer of shares to rights of first refusal. Ad-
ditional limitations, such as the inability to convey the shares of 
stock for a fixed period of time can also be stipulated. Likewise, 
preemptive rights for the issuance and subscription of new shares 
can also be included in the by-laws. All these contractual devices 
are particularly important in the context of family owned businesses, 
where shareholders may wish to keep the entity as closed as possi-
ble. By setting up these types of clauses, third parties are normally 
denied access to ownership. 
G. Protection Mechanisms 
The SAS Model Law contains significant protection mecha-
nisms, which are more sophisticated and effective than those nor-
mally contained in traditional corporate law across the Latin Amer-
ican region. As it has been stated before, the Model Law provides 
significant leeway to business participants. Thus, most ex ante legal 
                                                                                                             
 140. REYES, supra note 10, at 113. 
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devices containing restrictions to freedom of contract or setting forth 
prohibitions imposed upon directors, officers and shareholders, are 
not included in such Model Law. By means of this approach, direc-
tory regulations are replaced with default provisions, which are only 
applicable in the absence of specific contractual provisions. 
To prevent the misuse of the corporate form, the Model Law 
contains legal standards aimed at the protection of shareholders and 
creditors. For example, as noted above, third parties are entitled to 
bring actions for piercing the corporate veil where there is an abu-
sive or fraudulent use of the business entity. Additionally, minority 
shareholders are protected by certain causes of action intended to 
reduce tunneling and abuse of right. 
The point of departure for this legal approach is the well-known 
presence of agency problems existing between controlling and mi-
nority shareholders (as opposed to the traditional dichotomy which 
confronts the interests of management vis-a-vis those of sharehold-
ers as a class).141 As a result of the significant capital concentration 
across the region,142 controlling shareholders are enabled to extract 
private benefits of control. If this situation remains unharnessed, 
non-controlling shareholders may be expropriated.143 Consequently, 
                                                                                                             
 141. For a detailed discussion on agency problems, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., 
supra note 6. 
 142. See GORGA, supra note 26 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that 
the capital structure seen in the Latin American region, is somewhat similar to 
that of Continental Europe. Thus, in terms of agency problems, the solutions pro-
posed in both regions should share certain characteristics. Klaus J. Hopt notes: 
In Continental European company laws, the primary principal-agent con-
flict is not so much the conflict between shareholders and the board of 
directors, but rather the conflict between minority shareholders and the 
majority shareholder. This reflects the different prevailing patterns of 
stock ownership and control structures in the United States and Great 
Britain on the one hand and, broadly speaking, in Continental European 
states on the other. 
See Hopt, supra note 7, at 1166. 
 143. Commenting on the several notions of corporate governance, Donald 
Clarke notes the following regarding protection of minority shareholders: 
This concept is concerned with issues of finance and agency cost and has 
a policy component: the prevention of the exploitation of those who sup-
ply the money by those who control it. It centers on the relationship be-
tween stockholders, the board of directors, and senior management, and 
in effect asks, with Schleifer and Vishny, ‘[H]ow can financiers be sure 
that, once they sink their funds [into a firm], they get anything but a 
worthless piece of paper back from the manager?’ 
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the Model Law contains provisions designed to counteract potential 
abuse of rights.144 This theory of abuse of rights has been widely 
developed in foreign jurisdictions, particularly when dealing with 
the exercise of voting rights by majority shareholders.145 The insti-
tution of abuse of rights (abus de droit) has become an important 
mechanism for protecting shareholders in close corporations in 
countries adhering to the civil law tradition, which generally lack 
the equity remedies present in the common law.  
Article 42 of the Model Law states that “[s]hareholders shall ex-
ercise their voting rights in the interest of the simplified stock cor-
poration.”146 In this vein, when there is evidence of decisions ren-
dered by a corporate body undertaken for the sole benefit of control-
ling shareholders, or aimed at purposes different from the corporate 
interest, the affected parties may seek judicial redress. Motives that 
constitute abuse of right may include inflicting harm or damages 
upon other shareholders or the corporation, or unduly extracting pri-
vate gains for personal benefit, among others. 
The abuse of rights theory is applied to three different instances, 
depending on the facts of the case: abuse of majority, abuse of mi-
nority and abuse of equal shareholdings (i.e., dual ownership on a 
fifty-fifty distribution). By adopting these protection mechanisms, 
the provisions of the Model Law introduce to Latin American Cor-
porate Law the important developments on this field, spearheaded 
by French courts. Barthélémy Mercadal has noted on this regard 
that:  
Voting rights may not be used in a discretionary manner. 
Courts will often temper voting liberty through the applica-
tion of the abuse of right doctrine. Thus, they will penalize 
any and all decisions responding to an abusive exercise of 
voting rights, i.e., those votes issued in contradiction to the 
corporation and cast with the sole purpose of benefitting the 
majority (or minority) shareholders to the detriment of their 
                                                                                                             
See Clarke, supra note 18, at 79. 
 144. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 42. 
 145. In the United States, the language used is that of “oppression” instead of 
abuse. See Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). 
 146. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 42. 
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counterparties.147  
The action for abuse-of-right provided under the Model Law 
may result in damages and rescission of an abusive act. 
H. Restructuring Transactions 
The rules on restructuring transactions in the Model Law are 
more flexible as compared to traditional corporate law prevailing in 
the Latin American region. For instance, Article 33 of the model act 
includes the so-called “short form merger.” This transaction may 
take place within a corporate group and consists of a merger of a 
subsidiary entity into its parent. In order for this transaction to pro-
ceed, it is necessary that the parent entity of the simplified corpora-
tion shall own at least 90 percent of the outstanding shares of its 
subsidiary. In this event, the latter can be merged with the former, 
after a decision taken by the directors or managers of both entities. 
The short-form merger is an exception to the general rule whereby 
the shareholders meeting is the only corporate body entitled to make 
decisions regarding structural changes.148 
The Model Law also contains a specific provision concerning 
the sale of all or substantially all assets of the corporation.149 In this 
type of transaction, the selling entity may receive either cash or 
shares of the purchasing entity as consideration. The Model Law 
defines it as the event where “a simplified stock corporation purports 
to sell or convey assets and liabilities amounting to 60% or more of 
its equity value . . . .”150 In this event, the selling corporation does 
not cease to exist immediately, as is the case in a merger transaction. 
In fact, in order for it to be extinguished, it is necessary to wind up 
the corporation through the distribution of its remaining assets. The 
sale of all or substantially all assets, which obviously takes place 
                                                                                                             
 147. BARTHELEMY MERCADAL, MEMENTO PRATIQUE : SOCIETES 
COMMERCIALES, 584 (Éditions Francis Lefebvre 1995). 
 148. The short-form merger was first introduced by Anglo-American company 
law. DEL. CODE ANN. (Delaware Code Annotated) tit. 8, § 253, contains the rele-
vant provisions. For a detailed discussion, see REYES, supra note 10, at 132. 
 149. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 32. 
 150. Id. 
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outside of the ordinary course of business, requires majority share-
holder approval.  
Additional provisions are included to protect the rights of mi-
nority shareholders in restructuring transactions of simplified cor-
porations, including the applicability of dissenter rights and ap-
praisal remedies under certain circumstances.151 
I. Dissolution and Winding Up 
It is as important to consider the legal framework for the formal-
ization of business entities, as the rules relating to their dissolution 
and winding up. Therefore, it is useful to thoroughly regulate the 
entire cycle of a business, so that it can be formalized at the outset 
in accordance with up-to-date legal provisions and also be able to 
close its operations and resolve all relations with creditors and share-
holders at the end of such a cycle. This is particularly relevant in 
light of the obvious fact that many of the business entities will not 
be successful and therefore will need to close their operations and 
resolve all outstanding legal situations before extinction. In that 
sense, it is useful to provide a few suggested rules to govern its dis-
solution and liquidation.  
The Model Law contains three articles devoted to the dissolution 
and winding up of the simplified corporation. These rules are par-
ticularly useful for corporations that have gone out of business but 
need not resort to an insolvency proceeding to close their operations 
and resolve all situations with creditors and shareholders. This situ-
ation frequently takes place in MSMEs in cases in which the corpo-
ration’s liabilities do not exceed the value of available assets after 
dissolution. In these situations, it is necessary for those responsible 
for the business venture to provide publicity concerning the state of 
liquidation, appoint liquidators, prepare inventories and other finan-
cial statements, sell corporate assets, pay liabilities according to le-
gal priorities, and eventually return any remaining assets to the 
shareholders. 
                                                                                                             
 151. Id. at art. 30. 
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Article 34 of the Model Law contains the events of dissolution. 
There is an attempt in the Model Law to simplify the processes of 
dissolution and liquidation in order to make them expeditious, less 
ritualistic, and more in tune with contemporary business needs. Dis-
solution for the simplified corporation will become effective as of 
the date at which the shareholders’ decision to wind up the business 
entity, or the acknowledgment of the relevant legal cause for disso-
lution, is filed before the commercial registry. There is no need for 
further proceedings or decisions rendered by any third party. The 
only exception to the above mentioned rule relates to such cases in 
which the term of duration has elapsed (if expressly included by the 
shareholders in the company’s by-laws). In this case, the corporation 
will be dissolved automatically. 
Furthermore, dissolution does not take place in events related 
exclusively to the reduction of a minimum number of shareholders, 
or the increase of shareholders above a predefined number. The ab-
sence of provisions setting forth plurality requirements or caps con-
cerning the amount of shareholders effectively excludes any man-
datory winding up events resulting from such circumstances. 
Article 35 of the Model Law contains provisions aimed at curing 
the events of dissolution. The inclusion of these methods responds 
to the fact that, whenever materially possible, it is deemed to be less 
costly to preserve the business, instead of allowing for its dissolu-
tion. Consequently, the Model Law establishes that dissolution 
events may be cured by adopting any and all measures available to 
that effect, provided that such measures are adopted within one year, 
following the date in which the shareholders’ assembly acknowl-
edged the cause of dissolution.152 Furthermore, in order to incentiv-
ize the conversion of other business entities into simplified corpora-
tions, and with the aim of furthering corporate law beyond the pre-
sent state of formalism, the Model Law contains an additional pro-
vision intended to avoid dissolution.153 In fact, whenever there is a 
                                                                                                             
 152.  See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 35. 
 153.  Id. 
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business entity, organized under any form for which an event of dis-
solution consists of the reduction of the minimum number of share-
holders, partners or members, such instance may be cured by con-
version into a simplified corporation. Article 35 of the Model Law 
mandates that in order for this event to take place, a unanimous de-
cision must be rendered by the holders of all issued shares, or by the 
will of the surviving shareholder, partner or member. 
J. Dispute Resolution 
According to comparative legal theory, the adoption or trans-
plantation of substantive rules of a foreign origin may have a limited 
impact on the receiving jurisdiction, if the transplanted rules are not 
adequately accompanied by an effective institutional framework 
aimed at facilitating their enforcement.154 Consequently, the Model 
Law contains provisions concerning dispute resolution mechanisms, 
which are oriented towards the efficient application of the law in the 
event of disputes among business parties. 
The rules on this topic include the well-known methods of arbi-
tration and mediation. The adoption of these mechanisms responds 
to the frequent lack of expeditious judicial enforcement mechanisms 
throughout the region.155 The Model Law also contains an additional 
                                                                                                             
 154. See Mendoza, supra note 30: 
The imposition of foreign rules without concern for local conditions (i.e. 
demand for law, pre-existing political and social arrangements, institu-
tional background) is usually a recipe for failed legal transplants. Under 
this view, the principal effect of the program mentioned earlier was to 
increase the disparity between the law in the books and the law in action 
without significant improvements in the actual protection of outside in-
vestors. 
Katharina Pistor further illustrates the point: “Without ensuring complementari-
ties between the new law and preexisting legal institutions, harmonization may 
distort rather than improve the domestic legal framework.” Katharina Pistor, The 
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 98 (2002). 
 155. For example, under the Chilean law on simplified corporations, arbitra-
tion is mandatory in all instances. This effectively bars parties from taking dis-
putes related to or under the simplified corporation, to state judges. See art. 441 
CÓD. COM. (Chile), as modified by Law no. 20190, June 5, 2007. Although this 
solution may seem drastic, it is merely a natural response to the dramatic situation 
of judicial backwardness experienced throughout the region. 
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dispute resolution system, which relates to the assignment of adju-
dication powers to specialized judicial or quasi-judicial courts. This 
proposal is intended to counteract the general absence in Latin 
America of specialized judicial tribunals in charge of commercial or 
corporate law matters.  
The Colombian experience in this regard is noteworthy. In this 
jurisdiction, a short-term solution to the lack of specialized courts 
has been the introduction of a quasi-judicial decision making body 
within a governmental entity (i.e., Superintendence of Companies). 
This type of court has been in place in that country during the last 
five years. Such experiment has proven to be highly successful.  
The technical quality of specialized corporate law judges has 
been recognized as a crucial factor for the development of corporate 
law.156 It is obvious that having well trained, expert adjudicators re-
sults in better decisions. In the Colombian case, the Superintendence 
has a higher level of technical qualification and, consequently, a bet-
ter understanding of complex corporate issues, as compared to the 
ordinary judges. Furthermore, the degree of predictability, legal cer-
tainty, and expeditiousness of this specialized court is much higher 
than that of the regular judiciary. This point will be dealt with in 
more detail in Section V below. 
Article 39 of the Model Law also limits the possibility of appeal-
ing the first instance decisions rendered by this specialized tribunal. 
This is an attempt to curtail the common practice of endlessly ap-
pealing processes to higher judicial instances. This will produce 
greater legal certainty as litigating parties will avoid being subject 
to protracted litigation.157 The additional safeguards for litigants in 
Latin America, such as appeals for the violation of due process can 
be achieved through writs of constitutionality that are commonplace 
in Latin America (amparo, tutela, and mandado de segurança). 
                                                                                                             
 156. See Enriques, supra note 84. See additionally REYES, supra note 10, at 
147: “The underlying rationale for bypassing ordinary courts has to do with the 
notion that cases should be heard by highly-qualified officials with specialized 
technical and professional knowledge of corporate law.” 
 157. See Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 39. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL DATA ON SIMPLIFIED CORPORATIONS IN COLOMBIA 
As stated above, the OAS Model Law on simplified corporations 
is altogether based upon the Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 by means 
of which the SAS was introduced in that country.158 The Colombian 
simplified corporation has proven to be effective and useful for local 
and foreign investors. The empirically tested effects of the 
Colombian legislation provide a compelling argument which favors 
the adoption of the Model Law. The Colombian simplified 
corporation (SAS) has been in existence for almost a decade, with 
an unprecedented success and an equally unparalleled impact in the 
business community.159 The OECD recently acknowledged the 
positive effect of recent legal reforms in the country, including 
legislation aimed at streamlining procedures for starting a business: 
“Over the last decade Colombia has significantly improved its 
regulatory environment by simplifying the process to start a 
business, paying taxes, protecting investors and resolving 
insolvency, as well as reducing entry costs and barriers to 
entrepreneurs.”160 Simplification procedures to start a business are, 
to a large extent, a result of the adoption of the SAS’ enabling 
regulation. 
In simple terms, the Colombian SAS is by far the most success-
ful business vehicle created in the country. Alongside the wide 
recognition of its benefits by the local business community, reputed 
legal scholars have acknowledged the success of this Colombian le-
gal experiment: “[T]rue success stories may be mentioned from the 
                                                                                                             
 158. In its recommendations to the OAS on the proposed Model Act on Sim-
plified Stock Corporations, Dr. David P. Stewart highlighted the fact that such 
Model Law is based on the Colombian law from the outset. He said the following: 
“At our March 2011 regular session, the Chair proposed that the Committee 
should consider the topic of a ‘simplified stock corporation,’ with particular ref-
erence to the new law adopted by the Congress of the Republic of Colombia in 
December 2008.” Stewart, supra note 16, at 1. 
 159. The Colombian reform is partly based on the French SAS (Société par 
Actions Simplifiée), which was initially introduced in the mid 1990’s and has 
been updated since. See, among many others, Conac, supra note 46. 
 160. Economic Survey of Colombia 2017, OECD, at https://perma.cc/V2MX-
MUHT. 
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viewpoint of creation of new corporate structures. One of such in-
stances is the introduction of the simplified joint stock corporation, 
whose initial adoption by French Law, has been continued, by Co-
lombian Law, with an even more positive response by business prac-
tice.”161 Likewise, Professor Pierre Henri Conac has stated that: “Its 
success has been so great that this type of entity has replaced all 
other forms of business associations existing in the country.”162 
Since the introduction of the Colombian simplified corporation 
in 2008, the country has experienced a certain degree of 
“competition” among different types of business vehicles.163 Over 
the course of the years, the SAS phenomenon gave rise to a 
reduction in the use of other corporate forms which existed prior to 
its creation. The less sophisticated legal devices in pre-SAS 
company law may even render the future use of traditional business 
corporate entities unnecessary.164 The SAS has received wide 
recognition as the most convenient vehicle to conduct business, 
given its simplified nature and the low level of transaction costs 
                                                                                                             
 161. Embid, supra note 74, at 48. 
 162. Conac, supra note 46, at 30. 
 163. Although Latin America has no competing market for corporate charter-
ing due to the non-existing harmonization of private law, the EU has long since 
benefited from such a process. Recently, describing the prevailing trends in Ger-
many and the positive impact of importation of different models, it has been noted 
that: “This situation [of competition for corporate chartering] has given rise to the 
importation, into Germany, of numerous companies with a more flexible structure 
than that of the GmbH, but with similar functions. Notably, the English company 
limited by shares, known commonly as the Ltd.” Miguel Gimeno Ribes, Un mo-
delo societario de éxito en el Derecho alemán, in SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, 
supra note 25, at 337. 
 164. It has been argued that: 
The SAS has displaced all traditional business forms that existed during 
the 1971 Colombian Commercial Code rule. Today these outdated forms 
represent less than 4% of the total amount of business entities that file 
articles of association before the country’s 52 Mercantile Registries. Not 
surprisingly, the remaining 96,6% of the new incorporations corresponds 
to the formation of new Simplified Corporations. This is probably due to 
the formalistic nature of the previous regulation and the SAS’ reduced 
transaction costs, simplified structure and contractual flexibility. More-
over, the new type of entity has sparked legal innovation and fostered 
new business structures that were difficult to design in the recent past, 
given the rigidities of the Commercial Code regulation. 
Reyes, supra note 33, at 2. 
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associated with its formation and operation.165 This assertion is 
evident in light of the exponential growth of the simplified 
corporation in Colombia, during the last decade, as discussed below. 
A. Number of SAS Created Since the Enactment of Law 1258 of 
2008 
The Colombian SAS Law 1258 was enacted on December 5, 
2008. Within 25 days after such enactment, 160 of these entities had 
been created, representing 7.42 percent of the total number of enti-
ties registered in December of such year. By the end of 2009, the 
SAS was already the prevailing type of corporate entity being cre-
ated in Colombia. As seen in the Table below, during January of that 
year, 293 simplified corporations were formed, which corresponded 
to 11 percent of the total amount of business entities created in that 
month. By December of 2009, 1,551 SAS were incorporated. This 
figure raised the percentage of the total amount of business entities 
created in that month to 74.2 percent. As of December 2009, the 
traditional business association forms in Colombia, i.e., the sociedad 
anónima (regular corporation), the sociedad colectiva (general part-
nership), the sociedad en comandita (limited partnership), and the 
sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (closely held corporation), 
represented only 25.8 percent of the total business incorporated in 
that period. 
 
Table 4. Number of SAS Incorporated in 2009166  
 
Month Number of SAS 
incorporated 
Percentage 
out of total 
January 293 11% 
                                                                                                             
 165. According to Albán, supra, note 25, at 174 n. 5, José Miguel Embid in-
troduces the idea of a “simplification spectrum,” whereby different jurisdictions 
may be placed according to the contractual freedom awarded to businesspersons. 
In the words of José Miguel Embid, as cited by Jorge Oviedo Albán, Colombia 
would be placed in the “maximum” freedom category “due to the wide reception 
of contractual freedom, which has been introduced by the simplified model, 
alongside the repertoire of traditional figures.” 
 166. Source: Confederación de Cámara de Comercio, CONFECÁMARAS, at 
https://perma.cc/Y2ZC-WVB3. 
60                  JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 11 
 
Month Number of SAS 
incorporated 
Percentage 
out of total 
February 629 19,8% 
March 1019 33,8% 
April 1184 39,4% 
May 1424 47,6% 
June 1544 53,6% 
July 2052 59,4% 
August 1773 62,4% 
September 2316 66,5% 
October 2183 67,8% 
November 1872 70,2% 
December 1551 74,2% 
 
In 2010 the number of SAS continued to rise. During that year, 
more than 70 percent of the entities registered on a monthly basis 
were of this type. This fact provides evidence as to the progressive 
shrinking of traditional business forms predating SAS regulation.  
 
Table 5. Number of SAS Created in 2010, and Percentage Out 
of the Total Entities167 
 
Month SAS entities 
registered 
Percentage 
out of total 
January 2,422 70% 
February 3,091 71% 
March 3,364 74% 
April 2,817 74% 
May 2,879 77% 
June 3,069 79% 
July 2,923 78% 
August 3,448 81% 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. 
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Month SAS entities 
registered 
Percentage 
out of total 
September 3,734 82% 
October 3,414 83% 
November 3,275 84% 
December 2,935 82% 
 
These data show the rapid adoption of the SAS, and suggest that 
the Colombian business community was in dire need of a corporate 
vehicle which was flexible enough to accommodate their needs.  
B. Formalization and the SAS 
A comparative measurement concerning the rate of formaliza-
tion of business shows that the number of units formalized went 
from 35,921 in 2009 to 48,084 in 2010. This data show an impres-
sive 25.3 percent increase in the formalization of business entities in 
a single year. It is evident that the flexibility afforded by the SAS 
regulation is responsible for the significant number of businesses 
that migrated from the informal sector to full formality. An increase 
of more than one quarter in the number of formal incorporations is 
an eloquent demonstration of the potential of SAS to improve the 
business capacity of developing countries. As already explained, 
formalization also improves compliance with labor and social secu-
rity regulations, enhances publicity and transparency, and may in-
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C. Dimension of Incorporated SAS 
Aside from the impact of SAS on formalization, it is noteworthy 
that this type of corporate vehicle is useful for all types of undertak-
ings, both in terms of business activity and dimension. The Colom-
bian SAS has not only been useful for thousands of MSMEs, but 
also appropriate for large business undertakings. The data in Table 
5 below show a substantial number of business ventures that have 
chosen the SAS to carry out their economic activities. The broad 
majority of MSMEs are created as simplified corporations. 
Table 6. Newly Created Business Entities in Terms of Size169 
                                                                                                             
 168. Id. 
 170. Calculated in Colombian minimum monthly wages (Salario mínimo legal 
mensual vigente). One minimum monthly wage is equivalent to USD 251,728 (at 
an exchange rate of COP 2,930 for USD 1). 
Size Employees Total Assets170 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Micro 1-10 < 501 86,362 84,776 81,744 77,954 75,679 62,229 56,262 60,570 
Small 11-50 501-5,000 443 1,736 4,095 7,060 8,508 8,275 5,753 3,966 
Medium 51-200 5,001-
30,000 
46 279 849 1,484 2,097 1,397 947 590 
Large > 200 > 30,000 10 52 173 363 577 312 242 113 
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D. SAS Versus Traditional Business Associations 
As already noted, the menu of traditional business entities exist-
ing before the SAS was not responsive to market needs. As a conse-
quence, the new technology incorporated in the simplified corpora-
tion’s legislation has resulted in a significant migration to the more 
suitable framework of the SAS. Figure 7 and Table 7 show the out-
standing progress made by this company type vis-à-vis the previ-
ously existing ones. In less than a decade, the Colombian SAS has 
come to represent almost the whole market share of new registered 
entities, with 98 percent of businesses created as such by the end of 
2016. Figure 7 evidences the rapid growth and superiority of the 
SAS, while Table 7 presents detailed figures which show the actual 
amount of registered entities for each year beginning in 2009. 
 
Figure 7. Growing Market Share of SAS in Colombia171 
        
 
 
                                                                                                             
 170. Calculated in Colombian minimum monthly wages (Salario mínimo legal 
mensual vigente). One minimum monthly wage is equivalent to USD 251,728 (at 
an exchange rate of COP 2,930 for USD 1). 
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Table 7. Detailed Market Share of SAS in Colombia172 
 
Year Total Registered  Corporations173 
Total SAS  
Registered174 Percentage 
2009 40,690 21,809 54% 
2010 47,356 38,725 82% 
2011 58,676 53,713 92% 
2012 62,685 59,239 95% 
2013 63,861 60,975 95% 
2014 72,213 69,578 96% 
2015 63,205 61,315 97% 
2016 65,240 63,710 98% 
2017175 33,815 33,139 98% 
 
The success of the Colombian SAS can be attributed to this en-
tity’s superior production technology. As it has already been stated, 
its simple configuration allows for an easy adaptation to the busi-
nessperson’s specific needs. Colombian entrepreneurs quickly real-
ized the potential present in the SAS as contained in its forward 
looking legislation. Additionally, greater formalization of MSMEs 
has been achieved due to the fact that transaction costs have been 
reduced and the SAS law has allowed for a single shareholder to 
incorporate as a separate and distinct legal entity. 
Following the Colombian experience reflected in the data pre-
sented above, one can only expect that the widespread adoption of 
the Model Law in other Latin American countries would likely pro-
duce similar effects. These results could arguably ensue, in spite of 
the absence of a harmonized private law regime in this region. 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. 
 173. This includes all types of business forms other than the SAS, namely: the 
sociedad anonima (regular corporation), the sociedad colectiva (general partner-
ship), the sociedad en comandita (limited partnership), and the sociedad de re-
sponsabilidad limitada (closely held corporation). 
 174. Including newly formed entities and corporations already in existence, 
transformed into SAS. 
 175. Data between January 1st and May 31st, 2017. 
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V. SPECIALIZED CORPORATE DISPUTES COURT 
The Colombian experiment concerning the simplified corpora-
tion also included the creation of a specialized corporate law court 
designed to be a sophisticated forum for the adjudication of corpo-
rate disputes. The longstanding experience of the Colombian Super-
intendence of Companies was a critical element in order for this new 
jurisdiction to be implemented.176 
The Superintendence of Companies177 has had limited and ex-
ceptional quasi-judicial powers since 1971. This entity is in charge 
of a special adjudication mechanism which is in line with the prin-
ciples of the 1991 Colombian Constitution.178 Nevertheless, only by 
2008 did the entity form a specialized corporate law court, which 
                                                                                                             
 176. In order to address the issue properly, it is necessary to review first the 
legal and social conditions, which prompted the legislator to establish this mech-
anism: 
Pursuant to comparative law analytical principles, it is advisable to study 
the specific economic, social and political realities that underlie any 
given institution. Failing to do so may result in misleading conclusions 
vis-à-vis a particular legal reality. In the case of Latin American corpo-
rate law, such a reality is one of discrepancy between the law in the texts 
and its actual application. 
REYES, supra note 10, at 40. 
 177. The Colombian Superintendence of Companies is a governmental entity 
entrusted with supervision and other faculties over companies in the country. In 
the words of Robert Charles Means: 
The Superintendencia [Superintendence] possesses a broad mandate to 
supervise the creation and operation of Colombian non-financial corpo-
rations. The enactment of Law 58 of 1931 by which the Superintendence 
was initially created was permeated by the idea of protection concerning 
the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders from potential abuses 
carried out in business corporations. 
MEANS, supra note 88, at 283. The official comment written by the Congressmen 
who prepared the draft legislation establishing the entity reads as follows: “The 
disrespect of the corporate entity in our system is paradigmatic. We all have nu-
merous examples taken from real life to prove that it is a threat against a person’s 
equity to contribute assets to a corporation. This word is tantamount to loss, failure 
and fraud.” See REYES, supra note 132, at 625. 
 178. The Colombian Commercial Code [C. COM], issued under Decree 410 of 
1971, introduced the first quasi-judicial functions to the Superintendence of Com-
panies in the sphere of insolvency proceedings. As these functions were consoli-
dated with time, and the positive results secured the mechanism, the legislator 
gradually increased the matters to be decided by the entity. Additionally, article 
113 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution (CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 
COLOMBIA) mandates that the executive branch of government can undertake cer-
tain limited judicial functions of a non-criminal nature. 
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was radically updated in 2012 under a new and more efficient frame-
work model. This adjudicating body is entrusted with deciding over 
a broad range of corporate disputes.179 
The technical prowess of the Superintendence of Companies, 
with over 87 years of experience in the supervision of companies, 
should also be noted. This track record ensures a deep understanding 
of the corporate law issues which are brought before this forum:  
[O]ne of the Superintendence’s major contributions to the 
interstitial development of Colombian corporate law relates 
to the ‘administrative jurisprudence’ that it has provided. In 
fact, reported ‘precedents’, doctrinal opinions and no-action 
letters form an impressive body of law that is permanently 
used as a point of reference to elucidate the meaning of cor-
porate law provisions. Such reporting of decisions and other 
relevant materials supplies a large degree of predictability as 
to the outcome of proceedings that are litigated before the 
Superintendence. Robert Charles Means recognized this fact 
when he asserted that the Superintendence’s ‘primary con-
tribution to the development of Colombian corporate law has 
been through its jurisprudence.180 
The Colombian experience demonstrates that, although not a 
strictly orthodox solution, this dispute resolution mechanism by a 
governmental entity, adequately responds to local problems with the 
judiciary. First and foremost, among these problems is the patholog-
ical judicial delay, as evidenced in Figure 8 below, which shows that 
Colombia ranks almost in last place when measuring the number of 
days required to enforce a simple debt contract, far behind OECD 
standards. Therefore, one of the primary objectives of conferring 
quasi-judicial functions to an administrative agency has been to re-
dress the judicial backlog in rendering decisions. As will be shown 
below, one of the main aspects in which the specialized court stands 
out concerns its expeditious handling of cases. 
 
                                                                                                             
 179. Originally, the law provided only for adjudicating disputes over SAS 
companies, but gradually the legislature has extended the procedures to cover all 
types of corporate vehicles. 
 180. Reyes, supra note 122, at 52. 
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Figure 8. Number of Days Required to Enforce a Contract181 
A. Matters Brought to the Colombian Specialized Corporate Law 
Court 
Since the adoption of the SAS law in Colombia, the Superin-
tendence of Companies has consolidated over time as a very relevant 
Corporate Law court in Latin America. Law 1564 of 2012 by which 
the Colombian Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, provides 
broad adjudicating functions to the above mentioned Superintend-
ence, regardless of the corporate form within which the dispute 
arises (excluding financial entities under the surveillance of the Fi-
nancial Superintendence). The substantive matters to be adjudicated 
by the Superintendence of Companies are as follows182: 
1. Lifting the corporate veil; 
                                                                                                             
 181. OECD, supra note 13, at 73. The OECD study has noted that: 
Companies regularly rely on the court system to enforce contracts or set-
tle disputes. Lengthy and cumbersome procedures of dealing with courts 
can substantially add to firms’ costs and reduce their productivity. En-
forcing a standard debt contract takes much more time than in OECD 
and EMEs . . . . [H]igher enforcement costs hamper firm productivity, 
and this effect becomes particularly pronounced for young firms . . . . 
Id.  
 182. As contained in CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL (Civil Procedure 
Code) art. 24.5 [C.P.C]; articles 133, 136 and 148 of Law 446 of 1998; and articles 
28, 29 and 43 of Law 1429 of 2010. 
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2. Compliance with and specific performance of undertak-
ings within a shareholders agreement; 
3. Actions intended to set aside decisions rendered by cor-
porate bodies (i.e., shareholders’ assemblies and boards 
of directors); 
4. Acknowledgement of situations resulting in nullifica-
tion; 
5. Appointment of experts; 
6. Discrepancies over the occurrence of situations resulting 
in dissolution; 
7. Adjudication of intra-corporate conflicts; 
8. Abuse of voting rights; 
9. Liability of managers and directors; and 
10. Opposition to corporate reactivation. 
Some of these actions are entirely new for the Colombian legal 
system, and thus constitute an innovation in terms of protection 
mechanisms for businesspersons. As shown in Chart 1 below, it is 
relevant to observe that from 2008 and 2011, the complaints filed 
before this court related exclusively to four different issues ((i) ap-
peals of previous corporate decisions; (ii) intra-corporate disputes; 
(iii) actions to set aside resolutions of the shareholders meeting; and 
(iv) requests for dissolution). Alternatively, as of 2012, the types of 
legal disputes were significantly broadened to encompass additional 
matters (including, inter alia, (i) processes for lifting the corporate 
veil; (ii) the appointment of experts to provide appraisals of shares 
of stock, and (iii) actions arising from the abuse of rights).  
As an example of the above, causes of action for corporate abuse 
were introduced by both the SAS’ law and by the procedural reforms 
of 2012. The innovation present in the new protections awarded for 
corporate abuse has dramatically increased legal certainty in Colom-
bia, given the high degree of predictability and the introduction by 
the new court of a precise language establishing the situations which 
give rise to judicial remedies. This increased scope of matters that 
are resolved at the specialized corporate court is starting to provide 
credibility to the government’s ability to enforce substantive law 
provisions contained in the legislation. 
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Chart 1. Corporate Law Matters Brought Before Specialized 
Court183 
B. Broad Access to the Specialized Court 
The specialized court has made use of technology, ever since its 
inception, in order to facilitate public access to justice. Colombia is 
a highly centralized Republic, thus, parties located outside of the 
main capitals could not seek judicial redress or enforcement of con-
tracts in Corporate Law related matters. Since 2012, live internet 
streaming has been used by the court to carry out proceedings with 
the participation of litigants and businesspersons located in remote 
regions of the country. As shown in Figure 9 below, almost half of 
the lawsuits are currently filed electronically from locations away 
from the country’s capital. This means that swift and effective jus-
tice is reaching areas where there was none before. The already an-
alyzed trend which has taken place from 2012 to 2016 has not been 
restricted to Bogotá. In fact, there is an increasing participation of 
litigators from several different regions. 
Additionally, the Superintendence of Companies has introduced 
                                                                                                             
 183. Source: SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SOCIEDADES, at https://perma.cc/V3PM-
LRE8. 
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an electronic submissions platform, which allows users to present 
their briefs and get notified online, and facilitates communication 
between the judge and the clerks. This mechanism means that all 
proceedings may now be carried out electronically, without the need 
for parties to travel to the country’s capital city in order to either 
initiate action or defend themselves before the judge. 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of Lawsuits Filed in Bogotá “vis-à-vis” other 
Regions184 
C. Productivity and Performance of the Specialized Court 
The performance of the specialized court is also noteworthy. 
Figure 10 below presents the total number of lawsuits filed since 
2012. The steady increase in the use of the court evidences the grow-
ing confidence that businesspersons and their advisors have in the 
adjudication organism. In 2012, there was an average of only 4 law-
suits per month. This amount has since risen steadily up to 34 law-
suits per month by the end of 2016. This effectively means that from 
2012 to 2016, the Superintendence of Companies has dealt with 
1,227 corporate lawsuits. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 184. Id. 
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The growing confidence of businesspersons in the specialized 
court, evidenced by the growing number of lawsuits brought, is very 
likely due to the fact that the Superintendence has been able to ben-
efit from the insights of corporate law expert judges, highly trained 
clerks, and appropriate physical and technological facilities which 
allow for an adequate adjudicating environment. This is added to the 
experience and insight on corporate law matters gained by the Su-
perintendence within its functions as the companies’ supervisor 
agency. 
Another key aspect of the specialized court is its ability to decide 
cases expeditiously. In a country accustomed to protracted litigation, 
endless formalities, and corruption in the judicial system, it is a great 
achievement to have a jurisdiction in which these vices are absent. 
The high quality of the decisions rendered by the specialized corpo-
rate court and the short time required to obtain a final judgment 
speak eloquently for the great success of this legal experiment. Fig-
ure 11 below shows the efficient operation of the new jurisdiction in 
terms of the average time employed by the court to render a final 
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decision. This reduces the heavy burden of transaction costs for lit-
igating parties. In 2011, before the introduction of the specialized 
court, adjudication of such disputes lasted approximately 20 months. 
However, after 2012, the specialized court has reduced this time pe-
riod to an average of about six-months. This is the amount of time 
effectively taken to decide the case, from the moment in which the 
complaint is notified, until the final decision is rendered.  
 
Figure 11. Duration of Proceedings in the Specialized Court 
(months)186 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Model Law on simplified corporations for Latin America 
constitutes a breakthrough on several levels. The initiative promotes 
a harmonized legal framework tailor-made to the emerging econo-
mies of the region. The initiative’s primary objective is to generate 
economic growth for the jurisdictions which adopt the model legis-
lation by enabling businesspersons to incorporate with ease and mi-
grate to the formal economy.  
                                                                                                             
 186. Id. 
2018]                                   OAS MODEL LAW                                             73 
 
The Model Law takes into consideration some of the prevailing 
difficulties present in the different company laws and corrects them 
by introducing a forward looking and simplified legal framework. 
The Model Law’s provisions are also crafted to strike a balance be-
tween common law and civil law elements in order to find creative 
and purposeful solutions. This characteristic establishes a useful 
symbiosis which is based on the region’s specific characteristics and 
thus caters to its particular development needs. 
The Model Law also has a proven track record, based on the 
success of the Colombian experience with the SAS. Consequently, 
the initiative benefits from the real life experiment carried out during 
almost a decade in one of the region’s jurisdictions. This ensures 
that the solutions provided by the Model Law constitute a proven 
formula for the advancement of the economies in transition. 

